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The Preferential Liberalization of Services Trade 
Aaditya Mattoo and Pierre Sauvé1 
 
 Abstract  
 
This chapter takes stock of the most recent wave of PTAs with a view to informing some of the 
policy choices developing countries face in negotiating preferential agreements in services. The 
chapter first considers the economics of preferences in services and asks whether services 
trade differs sufficiently from trade in goods as to require different policy instruments and 
approaches in the context of preferential liberalization. The chapter discusses whether and how 
PTAs in services allow deeper forms of regulatory cooperation to occur and highlights the 
importance for third countries of multilateral disciplines on PTAs and the criteria suggested by 
economic theory to minimize adverse effects on non-members. The chapter also documents a 
number of lessons in rule-making and market opening arising from the practice of preferential 
liberalization in services trade as seen from a sample of fifty five agreements (out of the 76 
PTAs featuring services provisions that have been notified to the WTO to date, see Annex 1). 
The chapter asks whether and how PTAs differ from the GATS and whether such differences 
matter in policy terms.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The authors are grateful to Natasha Ward and Sacha Wunsch-Vincent for their valuable comments on 
and written contributions to an earlier draft of this chapter.  
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Key findings 
• The analysis of PTAs in services trade requires an extension of conventional trade theory in 
two ways, both of which relate to core-distinguishing features of services: first, the manner 
in which trade in services occurs (i.e., the typical need for proximity between the supplier 
and the consumer) and, second, the form that trade protection takes in the sector (i.e., 
restrictions on the movement of labor and capital, and stringent domestic regulations, such 
as technical standards, licensing and qualification requirements). 
• A common effect of many restrictive measures in services trade (given their regulatory 
nature) is to increase the costs of operation faced by foreign providers without necessarily 
generating equivalent domestic rents. There is therefore little or no cost to granting 
preferential access because there is little or no revenue to lose. In such circumstances, 
preferential liberalization will necessarily be welfare-enhancing. However, countries outside 
the preferential arrangement may lose. 
• A country is likely to benefit from eliminating, even on a preferential basis, any excessive 
fixed costs of entry by removing unnecessarily burdensome qualification, licensing and local 
establishment requirements. The presumption that a country will benefit from such 
initiatives is greater if agreements are not exclusionary but rather open to all parties able to 
satisfy the regulatory requirements maintained within the integrating area. The greatest 
benefits arise if recognition agreements include all countries that have comparable 
regulation.  
• Absent liberal rules of origin on investment that confer the full benefits of an integration 
scheme to third country investors the establishment of preferences may result in entry by 
inferior suppliers. Because the most efficient suppliers may also generate the greatest 
positive externalities, the downside risks of preferential liberalization may be greater - 
especially in crucial infrastructural services. This is particularly the case in service sectors 
with high location-specific sunk costs requiring the establishment of a presence close to 
consumers. Preferential liberalization may then exert more durable effects on the nature of 
competition than in the case of trade in goods. For instance, concluding an agreement that 
allows second-best providers to obtain a first-mover advantage may imply that a country 
could be stuck with such providers even if it subsequently liberalizes on an MFN basis. 
• The gains from preferential agreements are likely to be significant in areas where there is 
scope for more fully reaping economies of scale. In principle, these gains can also be 
reaped through MFN liberalization, but in practice the full integration of markets may require 
a deeper convergence of regulatory regimes. Regulatory cooperation may be more 
desirable - and likely more feasible - among a subset of countries than if pursued on a 
global scale. 
• Regional and/or international harmonization or standardization can be an important and 
cost-effective way of improving national standards. In such situations, the best partners for 
regulatory cooperation are likely to be those with the soundest regulatory frameworks. Such 
partners may not always be found within regional compacts. 
• There are gains from regulatory cooperation but also costs. The former will dominate where 
national regulation can be improved and where the process of regulatory convergence or 
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harmonization can take place, taking into account local circumstances. The costs are likely 
to be smallest when foreign regulatory preferences are similar and regulatory institutions are 
broadly compatible. 
•  “South-South” PTAs covering services can be looked at as a variant of the infant-industry 
argument. Exposure to competition first in the more sheltered confines of a regional market 
may help firms prepare for global competition. Firms that have gained competitiveness at 
the regional level may also be less likely to resist broader-based liberalization. The risk does 
exist, however, that regional liberalization might create a new constellation of vested 
interests that could resist further market opening. The GATS offers a way out of this 
dilemma by allowing Member countries to pre-commit to future multilateral liberalization, 
signaling a time-frame over which regional preferences may be progressively eroded and/or 
eliminated. 
• The sequence of preferential market opening in services rarely, if ever, predates preferential 
talks in goods trade. Countries that engage in services-related PTAs either pursue such 
negotiations alongside merchandise trade negotiations in a manner analogous to the WTO’s 
“Single Undertaking” approach or pursue services talks sequentially once a PTA in goods 
trade has been agreed. 
• In practice, PTAs tend to show broad commonality, both among each other and vis-à-vis 
the GATS, as regards the standard panoply of disciplines directed towards the progressive 
opening of services markets.  
• Starting with the NAFTA in 1994, an increasing number of PTAs have in recent years sought 
to complement disciplines on cross-border trade in services (modes 1 and 2 of the GATS) 
with a more comprehensive set of parallel disciplines on investment (both investment 
protection and liberalization of investment in goods- and services-producing activities) and 
the temporary movement of business people (related to goods and services trade and 
investment in a generic manner).2  
• PTAs featuring comprehensive or generic investment disciplines typically provide for a right 
of non-establishment (i.e. no local presence requirement as a pre-condition to supply 
services) as a means of encouraging cross-border trade in services. Such a provision, for 
which no GATS equivalent exists, might prove particularly well suited to promoting digital 
trade. 
• PTAs covering services typically feature a liberal “rule of origin”/denial of benefits clause, 
i.e. extend preferential treatment to all legal persons conducting substantial business 
operations in a member country. In practice, the adoption of a liberal stance in this regard 
implies that the post-establishment treatment of what is often the most important mode of 
supplying services in foreign markets – investment – is non-preferential (i.e. MFN equivalent) 
as regards third country investors.  
                                                 
2 For a fuller account of the treatment of investment and the movement of labor in PTAs, see OECD 
(2002d) and World Bank (2005; 2006 (GEPs).) 
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• PTAs covering services tend to follow two broad approaches as regards the modalities of 
services trade and investment liberalization. A number of PTAs tend to replicate the use, 
found in GATS, of a positive list or hybrid approach to market opening, whereas others 
pursue a negative-list approach. More than half of all PTAs featuring services provisions 
concluded to date proceed on the basis of a negative list approach. Such agreements are 
more prevalent in the Western Hemisphere, reflecting the influence of the NAFTA, as well as 
in agreements conducted along North-South lines (with the exception of the EU and EFTA 
agreements). 
• While both positive and negative list approaches can in theory generate broadly equivalent 
outcomes in liberalization terms, as a practical matter a negative list approach can be more 
effective in locking in the regulatory status quo. As well, the process of “getting there” tends 
to differ, with a number of good governance-enhancing features associated with negative 
listing, most notably in transparency terms. Studies devoted to the practice of preferential 
market opening suggest that North-South PTAs based on a negative list approach tend to 
achieve deepest, WTO+, liberalization. 
• PTAs are becoming more flexible and important variations are being introduced depending 
on the negotiating partners. PTAs increasingly mix positive and negative list approaches 
under the same agreement. Recourse to negative listing is particularly pronounced in the 
investment area, whereas some agreements use both approaches depending on the sector 
or mode of supply (e.g. positive listing for cross-border trade and negative listing for 
commercial presence; or negative listing for banking services and positive listing for 
insurance services).   
• A small number of governments participating in PTAs, particularly those adopting a negative 
list approach to liberalization, have shown a readiness to subsequently extend regional 
preferences on an MFN basis under the GATS. This may reflect both a realization that 
preferential treatment may be harder to confer in services trade (and is indeed perhaps 
economically undesirable with regard to investment) and that multilateral liberalization may 
offer greater opportunities of securing access to the most efficient suppliers, particularly of 
infrastructural services likely to exert significant effects on economy-wide performance.  
• The issue of preference erosion remains weakly understood in services trade, and the 
completion of the Doha Development Agenda should provide clear empirical indications of 
the extent (including in sectoral terms) to which PTA signatories are willing to extend 
preferential commitments on an MFN basis. Studies show that the level of liberalization 
achieved in many PTAs exceeds current Doha Round offers by a significant margin.   
• PTAs have generally made little progress in tackling the rule-making interface between 
domestic regulation and trade in services. Indeed, many PTAs feature provisions in this area 
that are no more fleshed out and, in some instances, weaker or more narrowly drawn (i.e. 
focusing solely on professional services) than those arising under Article VI of the GATS 
(including the Article VI:4 work program). More headway has been made on creating 
domestic regulation disciplines at the multilateral level than at the PTA level, and a large 
number of PTAs today affirm the desire of signatories to incorporate by reference any future 
progress made under the GATS Article VI:4 negotiating mandate. 
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• PTAs should in principle offer greater scope for making speedier headway on matters 
relating to regulatory co-operation in services trade, notably in areas such as services-
related standards and the recognition of licenses and professional or educational 
qualifications. Despite the greater initial similarities in approaches to regulation and greater 
cross-border contact between regulators that geographical proximity can afford, progress 
in the area of domestic regulation has been slow and generally disappointing even at the 
PTA level. Several PTAs, including South-South agreements such as Mercosul or AFAS 
(ASEAN) have reached trade-facilitating mutual recognition agreements, notably in selected 
regulated professions and highly skilled occupations.  
• With a few exceptions, PTAs have made little headway in tackling the key “unfinished” rule-
making items on the GATS agenda. This is most notably the case of disciplines on 
emergency safeguards and subsidies for services, where governments confront the same 
technical challenges and political sensitivities at the PTA level as they do on the multilateral 
front. More progress has however been made at the PTA level in opening up procurement 
markets for services, though such advances have tended to be made in procurement 
negotiations rather than in the services field.  
• While there is considerable diversity in terms of additional sector coverage in PTAs for 
individual countries, PTAs are found to go beyond existing GATS commitments and DDA 
offers across all country groupings. The PTA-induced ‘jump’ in sector coverage for 
developing countries is much larger than for developed countries, as the latter had higher 
sectoral coverage levels to start with under their GATS schedules. 
• As regards the sectoral patterns of liberalization, the available empirical evidence attests to 
significant WTO+ advances across the full range of traded services. This includes both 
sectors that have attracted less commitments and DDA offers under the GATS - for 
example audiovisual services - as well as those that have generally proven more attractive 
in a multilateral setting, such computer, tourism or telecom services.   
• The economic importance – and hence negotiating leverage – of PTA partners can exert a 
significant influence on the level of services liberalization flowing from preferential 
agreements. 
• Though notable WTO+ advances can be found in may PTAs, particularly those negotiated 
on a North-South basis, services-related PTAs nonetheless encounter resistance to market 
opening in service sectors that have proven  difficult to address at the multilateral level (e.g. 
air and maritime transport; audio-visual services3; movement of service suppliers; energy 
services).  
• A number of novel advances have been made in tackling new regulatory issues or opening 
up new sectors in recent preferential agreements. Market-opening advances are also 
notable in sectors where new (post-Uruguay Round), pro-liberalization constituencies have 
                                                 
3 While such a result obtains within the great majority of PTAs, some agreements, notably the Chile-
Mexico FTA, the Chile-MERCOSUL FTA and the majority of PTAs involving the United States have 
achieved some measure of liberalization in audio-visual services. The same applies to labor mobility. See 
Roy, Marchetti and Hoe Lim (2006) and Sauvé and Ward (2009). 
 
7 
 
emerged seeking to use trade agreements to secure expanded opportunities in world 
markets. Among these are rules governing digital trade, pro-competitive disciplines in the 
tourism sector, express delivery services, as well as greater advances on freeing up Mode 4 
trade. A number of PTAs have also begun to tackle the issue of aid for trade in services 
trade, albeit through non-binding provisions. In so doing, PTAs serve as useful laboratories 
for novel approaches to rule-making or market opening likely to inform the development of 
similar provisions at the multilateral level. 
• The relationship between PTAs and the WTO is not unidirectional in character but involves 
iterative, two-way, interaction between the two layers of trade governance in ways that can 
inform, subsequent patterns of rule-making and market opening at both the PTA and WTO 
levels. Examples of such interaction can notably be found in areas where WTO 
jurisprudence has clarified or interpreted the scope of key provisions governing services 
trade that are typically found both in the WTO-GATS and in the services and investment 
chapters of PTAs. 
 
Introduction 
While there is a large literature on the costs and benefits of integration agreements on 
trade in goods, there is hardly any analysis of the implications of such agreements in 
services. Such a gap is surprising given the strong growth witnessed since the mid-
1990s in the number of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) featuring detailed 
disciplines on trade and investment in services. The recent proliferation of PTAs 
covering services is evidence of heightened policy interest in the contribution of 
efficient service sectors to economic development and a growing appreciation of the 
gains likely to flow from the progressive dismantling of impediments to trade and 
investment in services. 
Seventy six preferential trade agreements featuring provisions on trade and investment 
in services have to date been notified to the WTO (See Annex Tables 1-3). This 
represents 28 percent of all notified PTAs, a share slightly higher than that of services in 
world trade (see Figure 1). Figure 2 reveals that, in line with their aggregate share in 
world services trade, developed countries are party to just under two-thirds (62%) of all 
PTAs featuring services provisions. The predominant share of such PTAs (49%) was 
conducted along North-South lines, with agreements among developed countries (i.e. 
North-North PTAs) accounting for a further 13% of notifications. Meanwhile, services-
related PTAs conducted along South-South lines, while on a recent upswing, account 
for 38% of notified agreements. From a political economy perspective, the 
predominance of services-related PTAs involving developed country partners is 
consistent with the aggregate pattern of specialization and direction of trade and 
investment obtaining in services trade today. 
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Figure 1. Services-related PTAs as a percentage of total PTA notifications to the 
WTO (2010) 
 
 
Source: WTO (2010). 
 
Figure 2.  Classification of services-related PTAs notified by the WTO by country 
groupings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: WTO (2010). 
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If all trade agreements can of essence, be likened to “incomplete contracts”, then the 
incipient multilateral regime for services is arguably the most incomplete of all. This 
greatly heightens the salience of studying the relationship between preferential and 
multilateral regimes for services trade. This chapter takes up this challenge by 
considering a number of questions – both theoretical and policy-related – arising from 
the study of the PTA-WTO divide in services trade. Questions to which answers are 
sought in this chapter include the following: whether the tools of economic analysis 
developed for studying the effects of preference in goods trade yield meaningful 
insights in the services field?; to what extent, and in what form, can developments in 
preferential agreements inform approaches to rule-making and market opening under 
the GATS?; whether observed differences in negotiating architectures across services-
related PTAs matter and the likelihood that such differences may inform the evolution of 
the WTO’s post-Doha architecture of services rules?; whether the issue of preference 
erosion arises in services trade and what its sectoral and/or modal incidence consists 
of?; and whether the practice of services liberalization in services markets suggests 
that PTAs can be likened to “optimal regulatory convergence areas”? 
 Regional and bilateral attempts at developing trade rules for services continue to 
parallel efforts at framing similar disciplines in the WTO, under the aegis of the GATS. 
For this reason,  regional and multilateral efforts at services rule-making are closely – 
indeed increasingly - intertwined processes, with much iterative learning by doing, 
imitation, and reverse engineering. Experience gained in developing the services 
provisions of PTAs has built up negotiating capacity in participating countries, 
providing expertise available for deployment in a multilateral setting. Since the GATS 
itself remains incomplete, with negotiations pending in a number of key areas (e.g., 
emergency safeguards, subsidies, government procurement, domestic regulation), 
regional and bilateral experimentations have generated a number of useful policy 
lessons in comparative negotiating and rule-making dynamics. As well, developments 
in WTO jurisprudence in the services field have begun to be reflected in patterns of 
market opening commitments found in PTAs, a trend that one may well expect to 
deepen as judicial activism under the GATS rises.4 
The efforts that countries devote to developing rules governing the process of services-
trade liberalization at the regional level typically come in the wake of the far reaching 
changes in many countries’ services and investment policy frameworks that have taken 
hold in the post-Uruguay Round period. . For many countries, PTA negotiations offer 
the opportunity to pursue, deepen or lock in some (or much) of the policy reforms put in 
place domestically in recent years and to reap the benefits, notably in terms of 
improved investment climates, likely to flow from such policy consolidation. 
                                                 
4 Evidence of such causality can be found in recent PTAs involving the United States, notably in respect 
of reservations made in regard to trade in on-line gambling services (Baptista Neto (2009). It may further 
be expected in the aftermath of the most recent WTO ruling in the dispute brought by the United States 
against China in the area of publications and audio-visual products (Shi and Chen, forthcoming). 
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This chapter takes stock of the more recent wave of PTAs with a view to informing 
some of the policy choices developing countries will typically confront in negotiating 
regional regimes for services trade and investment. While a country’s choice of 
integration strategy will in most instances be dictated by political considerations, there 
remains a need for a careful assessment of the economic benefits and costs of 
alternative approaches to services liberalization.  
The chapter focuses on two core issues. The first section considers the economics of 
regional integration in services, asking whether services trade differs sufficiently from 
trade in goods as to require different policy instruments and approaches in the context 
of preferential liberalization. Also discussed is whether and how PTAs may allow deeper 
forms of regulatory cooperation to occur. It highlights the importance for third countries 
of multilateral disciplines on PTAs and the criteria for PTAs not to be detrimental to 
non-members.  
The second section addresses the political economy of regionalism in services trade, 
identifying a number of lessons arising from the practice of preferential liberalization in 
services. It does so on the basis of a sample of 55 of the 76 services-related PTAs 
notified to date in the WTO. Of the total, 3 of the PTAs under review relate to 
agreements negotiated between developed countries, 27 to agreements conducted 
along North-South lines and 25 to South-South agreements. .  
 
1. The Economics of services trade in PTAs 
 
While the economic effects of preferential tariff arrangements are generally well 
understood (see Chapter XX Baldwin) and form the core of conventional trade theory, 
such is hardly the case of services. The analysis of preferential agreements in services 
trade requires an extension of conventional trade theory in two ways, both of which 
relate to core distinguishing features of services: first, the manner in which trade in 
services occurs and, second, the form that trade protection takes in the sector.  
Since services trade often requires proximity between the supplier and the consumer, 
one needs to consider preferences extended not just to cross-border trade, but also to 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign individual service providers. Moreover, 
preferential treatment in services is granted not through tariffs but through 
discriminatory restrictions on the movement of labor and capital (e.g., in terms of the 
quantity or share of foreign ownership), and a variety of domestic regulations, such as 
technical standards, licensing and qualification requirements.  
Given such differences, can one say that trade in services differs enough from trade in 
goods so as to modify the conclusions reached so far as regards the economic effects 
of preferential liberalization? In particular, what would happen if a country liberalized 
services trade faster in a regional or bilateral context than at the multilateral level? To 
answer such questions, the rest of this section will (1) review the various costs and 
benefits of trade preferences arising in services trade; and (2) discuss the scope for 
regional or bilateral regulatory cooperation in services trade. 
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1.1 Costs and benefits of preferential treatment in services trade 
 
The manner in which privileged access can be granted in services markets depends on 
the instrument of protection in use. By imposing a quantitative restriction on services 
output or on the number of service providers, a country can allocate a larger proportion 
of the quota to a preferred source. Examples of the former abound in air, land and 
maritime transport, where countries often allocate freight and passenger quotas on a 
preferential basis, and in audiovisual services, where preferential quotas exist on airtime 
allocated to foreign broadcasts. Examples of the latter include restrictions on the 
number of telecommunications operators, banks or professionals that may be allowed 
to operate. 
Another common means of restricting access to service markets that lends itself to 
preferential treatment concerns limitations on foreign ownership, on the type of allowed 
legal entity or on branching rights. While most host country governments provide 
foreign investors with post-establishment national treatment, such treatment rarely 
applies in the pre-establishment phase. This allows host countries to impose a range of 
performance requirements on foreign services providers, for instance in terms of 
training or employment in managerial level positions. These can easily be waived for 
members of a preferential arrangement.  
Preferences can also be granted through taxes and subsidies. Foreign providers can be 
subject to different taxes and may be denied access to certain subsidy programs. 
Again, these forms of discrimination can be waived selectively, as is the case, for 
example, in co-production agreements in audiovisual services. 
Another much practiced form of preferential treatment occurs through domestic 
regulations pertaining to technical regulations, licensing and qualification requirements. 
Countries can and do impose qualification and licensing requirements on foreign 
providers that may be more burdensome than necessary to satisfy otherwise legitimate 
public policy objectives. Where these are waived selectively in favor of members of a 
PTA, and denied to others who would otherwise qualify for the benefits, de facto 
preferences result. While regulatory preferences may arise in all sectors, they are 
especially prevalent in professional and financial services, where domestic regulatory 
requirements and licensing regimes respond to information asymmetries. 
 
Measures affecting variable costs 
 
A common effect of many restrictive measures in services trade is to increase the 
variable costs of operation faced by foreign providers without necessarily generating 
equivalent rents. In such cases, the analysis of discriminatory regulation can proceed in 
a manner analogous to tariffs. When tariffs are the instruments of protection, the costs 
of trade diversion can be an important disincentive to concluding preferential 
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liberalization agreements. Despite the increase in consumer surplus from any 
liberalization, there may still be an aversion to such agreements because the 
displacement of high tariff imports from third countries by low or zero-tariff imports 
from preferential sources implies lost revenue.  
The situation may differ when the protectionist instrument is a regulatory barrier that 
imposes a cost on the exporter without necessarily yielding a corresponding revenue 
for the government or any other domestic entity. Under such circumstances, which 
characterize much of services trade (given the regulatory nature of impediments), there 
may be little or no cost to granting preferential access because there is little or no 
revenue to lose. In such circumstances, preferential liberalization will necessarily be 
welfare-enhancing. 
However, countries outside the preferential arrangement may lose. Exemption from a 
needlessly burdensome regulation implies reduced costs for a class of suppliers and 
hence a decline in prices in the importing countries. This decline in prices may hurt 
third-country suppliers who may suffer reduced sales and a decline in producer 
surplus.  
The analysis of discriminatory regulation is also relevant to quantitative restrictions on 
the sale of services. In the case of goods, the quota rents can be appropriated by 
domestic intermediaries like the importer rather than the foreign exporter. However, in 
many services, intermediation is difficult because the service is not always storable and 
directly supplied by producers to consumers. Rents are, therefore, usually appropriated 
by exporters rather than domestic importers. As in the case of frictional measures that 
increase variable costs, there is typically no cost of trade diversion to the preference-
granting country.  
The main policy implication one can draw from the above discussion is that where a 
country maintains regulations that impose a cost on foreign providers, without 
generating any benefit (such as improved quality) or revenue for the government or 
other domestic entities, welfare would necessarily be enhanced by preferential 
liberalization. However, it bears noting that non-preferential liberalization would yield an 
even greater increase in welfare, both nationally and globally, because the service 
would then be supplied by the most efficient providers. 
 
Measures affecting fixed costs 
 
A number of measures that countries maintain can have the effect of increasing the 
fixed costs of entry or establishment in services markets. Examples include 
requirements to establish a local presence, license fees for entry into the market, or the 
need to re-qualify for purposes of providing professional services. As with measures 
affecting variable costs, a country is likely to benefit from eliminating, even on a 
preferential basis, any excessive fixed costs of entry by removing unnecessary 
13 
 
burdensome qualification, licensing and local establishment requirements in 
professional and financial services. 
Regardless of the chosen partners, the presumption that a country will benefit from 
such initiatives is greater if agreements are not exclusionary but rather open to all 
parties able to satisfy the regulatory requirements maintained within the integrating 
area. The greatest benefits arise if recognition agreements include all countries that 
have comparable regulation. The benefits in such instances come from both increased 
competition and greater diversity of services. 
 
Measures restricting the number of service providers 
 
The norm in many service industries is for the quantum (level) of competition to be 
restricted by government regulation. There may be legitimate reasons to do so, such as 
the existence of significant economies of scale or in industry segments characterized 
by natural monopoly features (the case of a number of network-based industries in 
energy, water distribution or transportation/railways). In such circumstances, the 
question of the manner in which entry is allowed - by mergers and acquisitions or 
through greenfield (i.e., de novo) investments, can assume considerable significance. 
Interestingly, allowing limited new entry by foreign firms, irrespective of whether this is 
done preferentially or on a most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment basis, may not be 
welfare-enhancing. The main reason is that even though consumers may benefit from 
the increased level of competition, such a gain may be offset by the transfer of rents 
from domestic to foreign oligopolists.  
Restrictions on de novo entry are often imposed with a view to channeling new foreign 
capital into weak or undercapitalized domestic institutions (a common occurrence in 
financial services for example) to help the restructuring process in the context of 
progressive liberalization. The above considerations may affect the preferred mode of 
entry: entry, that is, through acquisition implies less competition than greenfield entry, 
but it allows domestic firms to extract some rents through the disposal of their assets. 
Liberalization tends to generate gains when all barriers to entry are removed. But if only 
limited entry is allowed, then open, non-discriminatory access - for instance through 
the global auctioning of licenses - would predominate preferential access, which 
cannot guarantee that preferential (i.e., insider) investors will be the most efficient ones. 
Absent liberal rules of origin on investment, the establishment of preferences may 
indeed result in entry by inferior suppliers. Because the most efficient suppliers (in 
terms of costs and/or quality) may also generate the greatest positive externalities 
(including the dynamic learning properties associated with knowledge flows and the 
associated rise of total factor productivity), the downside risks of preferential 
liberalization may be greater (Matto and Fink, 2002). The ability of non-preferential 
liberalization to more readily secure access to the most efficient suppliers of services is 
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a matter of some importance given the crucial infrastructural role many services 
perform and the strong influence such intermediate inputs can exert on economy-wide 
performance.  
Preferential liberalization of entry barriers may also bring higher prices for consumers, 
lower takeover prices for domestic assets or lower license fees for the government (by 
limiting the pool of potential buyers). These concerns are likely to be compounded in 
concentrated markets, a common occurrence in many service industries in the 
developing world. 
 
Sunk costs and the sequence of liberalization 
 
Sunk costs are important in goods and services industries alike. However, location-
specific sunk costs - those incurred in supplying a particular market - are arguably 
higher in a number of service sectors to the extent that their provision requires 
proximity between suppliers and consumers. One consequence (which is closely 
related to the above discussion on barriers to new entrants) is that preferential 
liberalization may exert more durable effects on the nature of competition than in the 
case of goods. For instance, concluding an agreement that allows inferior providers to 
establish may mean that a country could be stuck with such providers even if it 
subsequently liberalizes on an MFN basis. 
Sunk costs matter because they have commitment value and can be used strategically 
by first movers to deter new entrants (Tirole, 1998). A firm that establishes a 
telecommunications or transport network signals that it will be around tomorrow if it 
cannot easily dispose of its assets. The commitment value is stronger the more slowly 
capital depreciates and the more firm-specific it is.  
Firms allowed early entry into such types of markets may accumulate a quantity of 
capital sufficient to limit the entry of new rivals. Such incumbency effects may be 
stronger in services with network externalities, such as telecommunications, where new 
entrants must match the technical standards of the incumbent (standards that the latter 
may have also played a large part in defining). The incumbent may also succeed in 
assuring itself of the services of the best franchisees by selecting them early on and 
imposing exclusivity arrangements on them. Each of these forms of capital 
accumulation enhances first-mover advantages and allows the established firm(s) to 
prevent, restrict or retard competition. 
Because of the importance of sunk costs in many service industries, sequential entry 
(which preferential liberalization with restrictive rules of origin may entail) can produce 
very different results from simultaneous entry. If entry is costly, an incumbent may be 
able to completely deter entry, leading to greater market concentration. Furthermore, 
the first-mover advantage may be conferred on an inferior supplier. The latter may 
naturally use such advantages to establish a position of market dominance, insulated 
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from more efficient third-country competitors. How durable such a position may be in 
practice will depend on the importance of sunk costs relative to differences in price and 
quality. 
Two important qualifications to the above reasoning can nonetheless be made. First, 
subsequent entry by a more efficient firm can take place through the acquisition route, 
thus circumventing some of the problems linked to first-mover advantages. This has 
notably been the experience of a number of countries in the financial sector, especially 
those where first movers may have overbid or sunk excessive costs in setting up their 
operations in the early stages of liberalization. Second, in certain service sectors, firms 
could learn by doing: the experience acquired by established operators during a 
previous period may reduce their current costs, enhancing their profitability and 
discouraging others from entering. Caveats aside, a country needs to carefully evaluate 
not just the static costs of granting preferential access to a particular partner country, 
but also how the eventual benefits from multilateral liberalization are likely to be 
affected. 
 
 
Static and dynamic economies of scale 
 
Combining of services markets through a regional integration agreement can lead to 
gains arising from a combination of scale effects and changes in the intensity of 
competition. In a market of a given size, there is a trade-off between scale economies 
and competition: if firms are larger, there are fewer of them and the market is less 
competitive. Enlarging the market shifts this trade-off, as it becomes possible to have 
both larger firms and more competition (World Bank, 2000).  
Regional liberalization can also act as an inducement to FDI. Apart from changing the 
organization of local industry, if PTAs create large markets and do not impose stringent 
ownership-related rules of origin, they may also assist in attracting foreign investment 
when economies of scale matter. For example, a foreign transport service provider 
might not find it worthwhile to establish in Latin America if each country market were 
segmented, but might find Latin America attractive with a continent-wide integrated 
market.  
One rationale for PTAs covering services is a variant of dynamic economies of scale or 
the infant-industry argument. “South-South” PTAs, in particular, are seen as a form of 
gradual liberalization. Exposure to competition first in the more sheltered confines of a 
regional market may help firms prepare for global competition. This approach improves 
on traditional infant-industry protection because some degree of international 
competition is fostered as a result of the integration process. There is also the 
possibility that firms that have gained competitiveness at the regional level are less 
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likely to resist broader-based liberalization. They may even champion subsequent MFN 
liberalization as they begin to reap the benefits of open markets and run up against the 
constraints of a regional market. In this sense, as noted in Chapter XX (Baldwin & 
Freund), PTAs can be seen as “building blocks” towards multilateral liberalization 
(Bhagwati, 1990; Lawrence, 1991). The risk does exist, however, that regional 
liberalization might create a new constellation of vested interests that could resist 
further market opening, raising the concern that regionalism can become a “stumbling 
block” to further multilateral liberalization. The GATS offers a way out of this dilemma 
by allowing Member countries to pre-commit to future multilateral liberalization, 
signaling a time frame over which regional preferences may be progressively eroded 
and/or eliminated. 
 
1.2 Regionalism and Regulatory Cooperation 
 
The gains from PTAs are likely to be significant in areas where there is scope for 
reaping economies of scale, as in certain international transport and financial services, 
and for securing increased competition, as in business or professional services. In 
principle, these gains can also be reaped through MFN liberalization, but in practice the 
integration of markets often requires a convergence of regulatory regimes. Such 
convergence might well be more feasible in a bilateral or regional context, for instance 
when “proximity” (be it geographic or in terms of income levels or legal traditions) 
implies closer  institutional and regulatory ties. The regulatory intensity of services trade 
make it necessary to consider whether and how PTAs can be conduits for trade- and 
investment-facilitating convergence in domestic regulatory practices. Simply put, under 
what circumstances is a country more likely to benefit from cooperation in a plurilateral 
or regional forum than in a multilateral one?  
Addressing the regulatory intensity of services trade 
 
The economic case for regulation in services arises essentially from market failure 
attributable to three kinds of problems: (1) asymmetric information (especially in 
knowledge-intensive industries, such as financial or professional services); (2) 
externalities (tourism, transport, water distribution); and (3) natural 
monopoly/oligopolies (especially in network-based services where access to essential 
facilities is a critical ingredient). 
In the first two cases, national remedies can themselves become impediments to trade 
if domestic regulatory requirements are needlessly burdensome or framed with a view 
to tilt competitive conditions in favor of domestic suppliers. The institution of some 
variant of a necessity test in services agreements (the purpose of which, as in goods 
trade, is to ensure some broad measure of proportionality between regulatory 
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objectives and the means of pursuing them), together with strengthened disciplines on 
transparency, would enable exporters to challenge the appropriateness of regulatory 
regimes abroad. Doing so would help ensure that domestic regulations serve legitimate 
objectives rather than mask protectionist interests, and hence create benefits for 
domestic consumers and users of services. 
In the third case (natural monopoly/oligopoly), it is the absence of regulation (typically 
pro-competitive regulation) that can lead to trade problems and directly inhibit and or 
nullify negotiated market access. As negotiations in basic telecommunications services 
have shown already, international rules on access to essential facilities and on means 
of ensuring that dominant suppliers do not abuse their market advantages to deter 
entry and stifle competition, can provide significant benefits to consumers and users of 
telecommunications services.  
In order to ensure that domestic regulations at home and abroad support trade, a 
country must decide on the appropriate level of coordination (i.e., multilateral, regional, 
or bilateral), the appropriate mechanism (i.e., international rules or standards), and the 
appropriate approach (i.e., mutual recognition or harmonization) to pursue in individual 
service sectors. International rules can do little to address impediments to trade arising 
from fundamental differences across countries in regulatory standards. In such 
circumstances, two approaches can be envisaged: harmonization and mutual 
recognition. Even though these approaches are often presented as alternatives, the 
former tends to be either a precondition or a result of the latter. Where differences in 
mandatory quality standards matter, mutual recognition may be feasible only when 
there is a certain degree of prior harmonization of mutually acceptable minimum 
standards. A similar logic applies to compatibility standards, though there may be no 
alternative to full harmonization if differences matter, as for instance in the case of 
road-safety standards, railway gauges or legal procedures.  
Regulatory cooperation may be more desirable - and likely more feasible - among a 
subset of countries than if pursued on a global scale. However, there is little, if any, 
empirical guidance on the payoffs to regulatory cooperation. What are the costs and 
benefits of deeper harmonization of regulatory standards and/or the establishment of 
mutual recognition agreements? The lack of empirical evidence complicates the task of 
deciding on the scope and depth, as well as the geographical reach and the optimal 
institutional forms, of regulatory cooperation. 
If national standards are not optimal or insufficiently developed, then regional and/or 
international harmonization or standardization can be a way of improving such 
standards, as has happened in the financial services field with the Basle accord on 
capital adequacy. In such situations, the best partners for regulatory cooperation are 
likely to be those with the soundest regulatory frameworks. Such partners may not 
always be found within regional compacts. Moreover, the standard-setting process can 
at times be captured by protectionist interests, in which case convergence around 
“best” regulatory practice can serve a useful liberalizing purpose.  
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Another consideration is that there are gains from regulatory cooperation but also 
costs. The former will dominate where national regulation can be improved. The 
aggregate adjustment cost of regulatory convergence depends on the level of 
differences between the policy-related standards of the countries involved in an 
integration area. The costs are likely to be smallest when foreign regulatory preferences 
are similar and regulatory institutions are broadly compatible. The benefits of 
eliminating policy differences through harmonization depend on the prospects of 
creating a truly integrated market, which depends on the “natural distance” between 
countries, and that in turn depends on factors such as levels of development, physical 
distance, legal systems, and language.  
If national standards optimally serve national objectives, there is a trade-off between 
the gains from integrated markets and the costs of transition and of departing from 
optimal domestic standards. For instance, a poor country may prefer to maintain a low 
mandatory standard for certain services because that reflects the socially optimal 
trade-off between price, quality and implementation capacities whereas the socially 
optimal trade-off in a rich country may lead to the adoption of - and a preference for - a 
higher standard. Under such circumstances, a harmonization of standards could create 
benefits in terms of increased competition in integrated markets, but would necessarily 
impose a social cost in at least one country. This matter may be non-trivial in the 
growing number of integration agreements concluded along “North-South” lines (see 
Box 1). 
 
Box 1. WTO+ and WTO-X Provisions in US and EC PTAs 
 
Horn, Mavroidis and Sapir (2009) compared substantive differences found in the PTAs 
of the United States (US) and the European Communities (EC). Such work drew useful 
attention to the distinction between so-called “WTO+” provisions, which relate to PTA-
induced outcomes that build on existing WTO disciplines, and “WTO-X” provisions, 
which involve disciplines that have not been (or yet to be) agreed at the WTO level. The 
authors further draw attention to the issue of “legal inflation” in distinguishing those 
provisions that are legally binding and enforceable from those that are merely hortatory 
in nature.  
 
Both EC and US preferential trade agreements contain a significant number of WTO+ 
and WTO-X obligations. However, EC agreements go much further in terms of WTO-X 
coverage than US agreements. When discounting for ‘legal inflation’ (i.e. when new 
provisions are not legally binding and enforceable), the picture remains largely the same 
for US agreements, but it changes dramatically for EC agreements.  
Indeed, adjusting for ‘legal inflation’, US agreements typically contain more legally 
binding provisions, both in WTO+ and WTO-X areas, than EC agreements. Horn, 
Mavroidis and Sapir conclude that the EU and the US have chosen markedly different 
strategies for including provisions in their PTAs that go beyond the WTO agreements. In 
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particular, EC agreements display a fair deal of ‘legal inflation’, a phenomenon almost 
totally absent in US agreements.  
 
While the work by Horn, Mavroidis and Sapir does not allow the authors to draw 
precise conclusions about this asymmetry of behaviour between the EU and the US, 
the fact that much of the ‘legal inflation’ occurs in development-related provisions, 
which are unique to the EC agreements, suggests that the EU has a greater need than 
the US to portray its PTAs as not driven solely by commercial interests. The authors 
speculate that such a pattern may reflect a lack of consensus on the part of EU 
member states about the ultimate purpose of these PTAs, such that the wide variety of 
provisions of weak legal value representing a compromise between various interests 
among EU members. 
 
Moreover, although EC and US preferential trade agreements do go significantly 
beyond the WTO agreements, the number of legally enforceable WTO-X provisions 
contained in EC and US PTAs is still in fact quite small. Provisions that can be regarded 
as really breaking new ground compared to existing WTO agreements are few and far 
between: environment and labour standards for US agreements, and competition policy 
for EC agreements. All such provisions can be seen as dealing with regulatory matters. 
Other enforceable WTO-X provisions found in both EC and US PTAs concern domains 
that are closely related to existing WTO disciplines, such as on investment matters 
(GATS, TRIMs), capital movement (GATS) and intellectual property TRIPs). 
 
The fact that the new, legally enforceable, WTO-X provisions all deal with regulatory 
issues suggests that EC and US agreements can be looked upon as vehicles of 
“regulatory projectionism”, i.e.  means for the two trade powers to export their own 
regulatory approaches to their PTA partners. The costs and benefits of assuming such 
regulatory obligations on the part of developing country partners require closer 
analytical scrutiny. 
 
.  
PTAs as optimum regulatory areas for services 
 
“Optimum regulatory areas” can be taught of as defining the set of countries for which 
aggregate welfare would be maximized by regulatory convergence. Such an area would 
balance the benefits and costs of participation. The benefits of eliminating policy 
differences through harmonization depend on the prospects of creating truly integrated 
markets, which depends on natural ties between countries and factors such as 
geographic and linguistic proximity. The costs depend on the ex ante similarity of 
regulatory preferences and compatibility of regulatory institutions. 
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In the definition of an optimal regulatory area, it must also be recognized that 
cooperation can be a vehicle to exchange information on different experiences with 
regulatory reform and to identify good regulatory practices. This form of cooperation 
can be especially useful for regulating new services in sectors characterized by 
continuous technical change. Developing countries may have a particular interest in 
cooperating with advanced industrial countries that have the longest experience with 
regulatory reform and where the newest technologies and their regulatory implications 
are often first introduced.  
However, whether an individual country benefits from regulatory convergence or 
harmonization, its willingness to participate in such an area may depend on where the 
standard is set, the level at which it is set, and the regulatory environment to which 
such a standard responds. The latter factors will in turn determine who will bear the 
costs of transition towards the adoption of such a standard. The incentive to make 
regulations converge may depend on the relative size of markets, with small countries 
often having more to gain. This may explain why small countries acceding to the 
European Union (EU) accept to bear the full cost of transition.  
It should be noted that the process of regulatory convergence can itself involve sunk 
costs of transition. The sequence in which a country chooses to harmonize (or 
progressively converge) its regulations with different trading partners is thus a relevant 
consideration. One reason is that the sequence of harmonization may influence the 
bargaining power of different country groupings in the negotiation over the level at 
which the harmonized standard should be set. For example, the countries in Eastern 
Europe that acceded to the EU on an individual basis could arguably have had a 
greater say in the EU-wide standard in specific areas if they had either been original 
members, negotiated collectively, or both. Similarly, harmonization first conducted at 
the MERCOSUR level, and then at the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) or WTO 
level, could imply different costs and produce a different outcome from direct 
harmonization at the broader level.  
A final consideration to note in regard to preferential regulatory convergence relates to 
the possible administrative burden implied by the maintenance - and administration- of 
distinct regulatory requirements and procedures as between members and non-
members of a PTA. Such costs may be sufficiently acute for a number of developing 
countries as to tilt negotiating incentives in favor of multilateral undertakings. It may 
also encourage the multilateralization of norms first brokered at the regional level or 
incite countries to simply extend to all third countries treatment similar to that afforded 
to PTA members, bearing in mind the limits of MFN-based outcomes on regulatory 
issues.  
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1.3 Third-Country Effects 
 
PTAs between countries that are WTO members or accessing the WTO can be 
potentially harmful to non-member countries as they imply preferential liberalization in 
favor of certain member states. Such discrimination violates one of the central 
obligations imposed by both the GATT and the GATS - the MFN treatment rule. The 
GATS is similar to the GATT in permitting signatories to pursue preferential liberalization 
arrangements, subject however to a number of conditions that are intended to minimize 
potential adverse effects on non-members as well as on the multilateral trading system 
as a whole. 
In the context of agreements liberalizing trade in goods, a sufficient condition for 
preferential liberalization to be deemed multilaterally acceptable is that it not have 
detrimental impacts on third countries. That is, the volume of imports by member 
countries from the rest of the world should not decline on a product-by-product basis 
after the implementation of the agreement (Kemp and Wan, 1976; McMillan, 1993). 
While in principle a simple enough criterion, it is not straightforward to implement in 
practice given that the focus is on trade flows at the individual product level. 
The liberalization of services trade implies not only that measures restricting the ability 
of foreign suppliers to engage in cross-border trade are reduced or eliminated, but also 
that factor mobility (and especially the establishment of a commercial presence) is 
allowed.  
In determining the welfare implications for third parties of regional integration 
agreements covering services, account therefore needs to be taken of the impact on 
trade and factor flows. Both of these flows are endogenous and interdependent. Simple 
prescriptions or criteria along Kemp-Wan lines therefore can no longer be applied (see 
Chapter XX Baldwin). If, for example, trade and factor flows are substitutes, a decline in 
trade in products need not necessarily be detrimental to an outside country, as greater 
factor flows substitute for trade. This is the standard case in neoclassical trade theory 
assuming constant-returns-to-scale technology. If, conversely, there are increasing 
returns, the relationship between factor movements and product-trade flows may well 
be complementary, i.e., an increase in one may be associated with an increase in the 
other. Although the presumption is that by liberalizing both product and factor markets, 
the aggregate benefits for participants will increase, and this in turn will be beneficial to 
the rest of the world as a whole (partly through induced growth and investment effects), 
straightforward criteria with which to evaluate such integration effects ex ante do not 
exist. These problems are compounded by the difficulty of establishing clear-cut criteria 
of product likeness in services, given the far greater degree of product differentiation 
and customer tailoring arising in services markets. 
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2. The Practice of Services Liberalization in PTAs 
 
The previous section suggests that – in theory – the inclusion of services trade in PTAs 
can help achieve greater transparency through rules that require mutual openness, 
heightened credibility of policy through legally binding commitments, and more efficient 
protection and regulation through rules that favor the choice of superior policy 
instruments. Yet, still today relatively little is known about the actual practice of service 
liberalization in PTAs. What can be learnt from the experience with PTAs governing 
services trade? Does the bilateral or regional route to services trade and investment 
liberalization actually offer significant prospects for speedier and/or deeper 
liberalization and more comprehensive rule-making than under a multilateral 
framework?   
This section discusses the manner in – and degree to - which PTAs covering services 
have indeed achieved the above mentioned theoretical objectives. It compares 
substantive provisions and negotiated outcomes under the GATS with progress made 
under a broad sample of PTAs featuring disciplines on trade in services.   
 
2.1. Key disciplines: convergence and divergence 
 
While PTAs covering services come in many different shapes and sizes, they tend to 
feature a common set of key disciplines governing trade and investment in services that 
are also found in the GATS, albeit with differing burdens of obligation (Table 1). Areas of 
greatest rule-making convergence between the multilateral and PTA levels relate to the 
agreements’ scope of coverage. Most common to both sets of agreements, and 
typically drafted in an identical manner are disciplines on transparency, national 
treatment, MFN treatment, as well as disciplines on payments and transfers, 
monopolies and exclusive service providers, as well as general exceptions. 
Considerable similarities also exist between the multilateral and PTA levels as regards 
the need for sectoral specificity (i.e. individual sectors or horizontal issues (e.g. labor 
mobility) requiring special treatment in annexes). 
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Table 1: Key disciplines in PTAs covering services 
Agreements MFN 
Treatmen
t 
National 
Treatment 
Market 
access 
(N-D 
QRs)+ 
Domestic 
Regulation 
Emergenc
y 
Safeguard
s 
Subsidy 
Disciplines 
Government 
procuremen
t 
Rule of origin 
(denial of 
benefits) 
GATS 
(1994) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Future Future 
negotiation
s 
Future 
negotiations 
Yes 
NAFTA 
(1992) 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes* No No Separate 
chapter 
Yes 
Canada – Chile 
(1996) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes* No No No Yes 
Canada – Colombia 
(2008) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Separate 
chapter 
Yes 
Canada – Peru  
(2008) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Separate 
chapter 
Yes 
Chile – México 
(1998) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes* No No No Yes 
Bolivia-México 
(1994) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes* Future No Separate 
chapter 
Yes 
Costa Rica – México 
(1994) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes* Future No Separate 
chapter 
Yes 
México – Nicaragua 
(1997) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes* No No Future 
negotiations 
Yes 
Mexico – Northern 
Triangle1  
(2000) 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes* Future No No Yes 
Central America – 
Dominican Republic 
(1998) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes* Future Future 
negotiation
s 
Separate 
chapter 
Yes 
Central America –  Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Separate Yes 
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Agreements MFN 
Treatmen
t 
National 
Treatment 
Market 
access 
(N-D 
QRs)+ 
Domestic 
Regulation 
Emergenc
y 
Safeguard
s 
Subsidy 
Disciplines 
Government 
procuremen
t 
Rule of origin 
(denial of 
benefits) 
Dominican Republic – 
US (2004) 
chapter 
Central America - 
Chile 
(1999) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes* No No Separate 
chapter 
Yes 
Chile – Colombia  
(2006) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Separate 
chapter 
Yes 
El Salvador –Taiwan  
(2007) 
Yes  Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes 
Guatemala – Taiwan 
(2005) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes 
Group of Three 
(1994) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes* No No Separate 
chapter 
Yes 
MERCOSUR 
(1997) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No Future 
negotiation
s 
Future 
negotiations 
Yes 
Andean Community Yes Yes Yes Yes* No No No Yes 
CARICOM 
(2001) 
Not 
specified 
Yes Not 
specified 
Yes* Yes No No Yes 
CARICOM – 
Dominican Republic 
(1998) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes* Future No Separate 
chapter 
Yes 
CARIFORUM –  
 European Community 
(2008) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Separate 
chapter 
Yes 
Central American 
Economic Integration 
 
Not 
specified 
No general 
article 
No No No No No Not specified 
EU 
(1957) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
(covered 
Yes Yes 
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Agreements MFN 
Treatmen
t 
National 
Treatment 
Market 
access 
(N-D 
QRs)+ 
Domestic 
Regulation 
Emergenc
y 
Safeguard
s 
Subsidy 
Disciplines 
Government 
procuremen
t 
Rule of origin 
(denial of 
benefits) 
under 
competition 
disciplines) 
Europe Agreements Yes Yes No Yes No Yes 
(covered 
under 
competition 
disciplines) 
No Beneficiaries 
specified 
through 
definition of 
“undertakings” 
EU-México 
(1997) 
 
Yes Yes Yes No (provisions 
on regulatory 
carve-out and 
recognition) 
No No Separate 
chapter 
Yes 
EFTA – Colombia  
(2008) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Separate 
chapter 
Yes 
EFTA – Co-operation 
Council for the Arab 
States of the Gulf 
(2009) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Separate 
chapter 
Yes 
EFTA – México 
(2000) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Not specified 
EFTA-Singapore 
(2002) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No Requests 
for 
consultatio
ns to be 
given 
sympatheti
c 
considerati
on 
Separate 
chapter 
Yes 
China – ASEAN No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes 
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Agreements MFN 
Treatmen
t 
National 
Treatment 
Market 
access 
(N-D 
QRs)+ 
Domestic 
Regulation 
Emergenc
y 
Safeguard
s 
Subsidy 
Disciplines 
Government 
procuremen
t 
Rule of origin 
(denial of 
benefits) 
(2007) 
China – Singapore  
(2008) 
No Yes  Yes Yes No No No Yes 
India – Korea  
(2009) 
Considera
tion to be 
given to 
request 
for MFN 
treatment 
Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes 
India – Singapore 
(2005) 
Considera
tion to be 
given to 
request 
for MFN 
treatment 
Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes 
Japan – Chile  
(2007) 
Yes  Yes No (only in 
relation to 
financial 
services) 
Yes No No Separate 
chapter 
Yes 
Japan – Indonesia  
(2007) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes 
Japan – Malaysia  
(2005) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Future No No Yes 
Japan – Philippines  
(2006) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Future Yes 
Japan – Singapore 
(2002) 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Separate 
chapter 
Yes 
Japan – Switzerland  
(2009) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes 
Japan –Thailand  Yes Yes Yes Yes Future No No Yes 
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Agreements MFN 
Treatmen
t 
National 
Treatment 
Market 
access 
(N-D 
QRs)+ 
Domestic 
Regulation 
Emergenc
y 
Safeguard
s 
Subsidy 
Disciplines 
Government 
procuremen
t 
Rule of origin 
(denial of 
benefits) 
(2007) 
Korea – Singapore 
(2005) 
 Yes Yes Yes No No Separate 
chapter 
Yes 
Malaysia – Pakistan  
2007) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Future No No Yes 
Singapore – Panama  
(2006) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Separate 
chapter 
Yes 
Singapore – Jordan  
(2005) 
No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes 
Taiwan – Nicaragua 
(2006) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes 
ASEAN Framework 
Agreement on 
Services 
(1995) 
Yes Yes Yes Not specified Yes No No Yes 
ASEAN- Australia 
(2009) 
Considera
tion on 
request 
Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes 
Australia – New 
Zealand Closer 
Economic Relations 
Trade Agreement 
(1988) 
MFN for 
excluded 
sectors 
 
Yes 
Yes Yes No Export 
subsidies 
prohibited 
Other 
subsidies 
excluded 
No Yes 
New Zealand – China  
(2008) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes 
US – Jordan 
(2000) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No Future 
negotiation
s 
Yes Yes 
US-Singapore Yes Yes Yes Yes* No No Separate Yes 
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Agreements MFN 
Treatmen
t 
National 
Treatment 
Market 
access 
(N-D 
QRs)+ 
Domestic 
Regulation 
Emergenc
y 
Safeguard
s 
Subsidy 
Disciplines 
Government 
procuremen
t 
Rule of origin 
(denial of 
benefits) 
(2003) chapter 
US-Chile 
(2003) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes* No No Separate 
chapter 
Yes 
US- Colombia 
(2006) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Separate 
chapter 
Yes 
US – Oman  
(2006) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Separate 
chapter 
Yes 
US-Panama 
(2007) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Separate 
chapter 
Yes 
+ Non-discriminatory quantitative restrictions 
* Rules on domestic regulation are set out more narrowly (in most cases they apply only to the licensing and certification of professional services 
suppliers) 
1 Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador 
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Lesser convergence (and more limited PTA progress) can be observed in 
areas of rule-making that have posed recurring difficulties in the GATS 
setting. This includes issues such as domestic regulation, emergency 
safeguards and subsidy disciplines for services.  
 
Most-favored nation and national treatment 
 
The principles of most-favored nation and national treatment constitute two of the 
most basic building blocks to any agreement on services, just as they do in the 
goods area. As with the GATS, very few PTAs set out such principles in unqualified 
form5, regardless of whether they are framed as general obligations (which is the 
case for MFN in virtually all agreements and for national treatment in agreements 
pursuing a negative list approach to liberalization) or as obligations that apply solely 
in sectors where liberalization commitments are positively undertaken.  
While one can easily understand why MFN is required within agreements that imply 
more than two Parties, so as to ensure an equality of preferential treatment among 
all signatories, the question arises of why an MFN obligation should be embedded in 
PTAs concluded among bilateral partners. Part of the reason lies in the policy 
interest, first addressed in the NAFTA, for members of a given PTA to automatically 
secure any PTA+ benefits that any one Party to the original PTA may be willing to 
accord to a third Party in a subsequent PTA. In the case of NAFTA, for instance, any 
NAFTA+ commitment that say Canada or Mexico might be willing to grant to the 
European Union in the context of a subsequent PTA would need to be granted to the 
United States. The issue of MFN treatment in service sector PTAs has generated 
much policy controversy in the context of the Economic Partnership Agreements 
that the member States of the European Union have entered into with the 
CARIFORUM countries and plan to conclude with other ACP country groupings6, 
with fears expressed that such a clause (which would only apply to agreements 
involving partners accounting for more than 1% of world trade) could reduce 
incentives for South-South PTAs in services if the benefits of such integration would 
automatically flow (for free) to EU members. Such a debate seems to have 
eschewed one important political economy consideration – that third country MFN 
rights allow smaller countries to benefit from the negotiating clout of larger partners 
that sign agreements with common partners.7  
                                                 
5 Only the Mercosul Protocol and Decision 439 of the Andean Community provide that no 
deviation from MFN and national treatment be allowed among members to the two 
integration groupings. 
6 For a fuller discussion of the issue of MFN treatment in EU-ACP EPAs, see Messerlin 
(2009). 
7 For a fuller discussion, see Baldwin, Evenett and Low (2009). 
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A weaker variation on the above discussion can be found in the recently concluded 
India- Korea FTA, which stipulates that if any party subsequently enters into another 
agreement which offers more favorable treatment to a non-party, then that party is 
to give consideration to a request by the other party for the incorporation of such 
treatment into the PTA. Any such incorporation should maintain the balance of 
concessions in the overall agreement.8 Similarly, in the ASEAN–Australia–New 
Zealand (AANZ) FTA, if any more favorable treatment is granted in a future trade 
agreement by one party to a non party to the AANZ FTA, then the other parties to 
the AANZ FTA may request consultations to discuss the possibility of extending no 
less favorable treatment.9. In addition, the requested party shall enter into 
consultations with the requesting party bearing in mind the overall balance of 
benefits.10 
 
Transparency  
 
As may be expected given the regulatory intensity of services trade, transparency 
disciplines are common to all PTAs covering services. These typically stipulate, as is 
the case under GATS, an obligation to publish relevant measures and notify new (or 
changes to existing) measures affecting trade in services and to establish national 
enquiry points to provide information on measures affecting services trade upon 
request. One innovation over the GATS is the provision that some PTAs make for 
members to afford the opportunity (to the extent possible, i.e. on a “best endeavors” 
basis) for prior comment on proposed changes to services regulations. Increasingly, 
such provisions are becoming legally binding. This is most notably the case in 
North-South PTAs, following a trend initiated by the US-Chile and US-Singapore 
FTAs. The latter development offers an interesting example of what could be 
described as “tactical” or “demonstration effect” regionalism, with advances at the 
PTA level creating precedents whose proponents hope will facilitate their 
subsequent replication at the multilateral level.11  
                                                                                                                                            
 
8 Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the 
Republic of India, Article 6.3. 
9 Agreement Establishing the ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand Free Trade Area, Chapter 8, 
Article 7.  
10 Furthermore, there is a measure of asymmetry in this provision as the obligation does not 
apply to bilateral or plurilateral agreements between an ASEAN state or the ASEAN states on 
the one hand and a non- party or Australia or New Zealand on the other. 
11 Other examples of demonstration effect/precedent-setting regionalism are the provisions 
on the linkages between trade and labor standards inserted in the waning days of the Clinton 
administration into the US-Jordan FTA and the recurring tendency of the European 
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Market access 
 
While PTAs covering services typically address non-discriminatory quantitative 
restrictions that impede access to services markets (addressed in part under Article 
XVI of the GATS), a number of earlier PTAs, particularly those concluded in the 
Western Hemisphere and modeled on the NAFTA, were actually weaker than the 
GATS, committing parties solely to making such measures fully transparent in 
annexes listing non-conforming measures and to a best endeavors approach as 
regards their progressive dismantling in future. In contrast, under GATS, WTO 
members undertake policy bindings in sectors, sub-sectors and modes of supply 
against which market access commitments are scheduled. Such a WTO-minus 
provision is no longer found in the newest generation PTAs entered into by the 
United States, Canada and others that had initially agreed to such a standard of 
treatment. Such a provision has been replaced by language such as that found early 
on in MERCOSUL and in the various PTAs to which EU Members are party, that 
introduce a prohibition on the introduction of new non-discriminatory QRs on any 
scheduled commitment and sector, mirroring a similar requirement under Article XVI 
of the GATS. 
 
Domestic regulation 
 
As discussed above, the argument has been made that PTAs in the services field 
provide scope for creating “optimum regulatory areas”, the presumption being that 
the aggregate adjustment costs of regulatory convergence and policy harmonization 
are likely to be smaller when foreign regulatory preferences are similar and 
regulatory institutions broadly compatible. Both sets of conditions are likelier on 
balance to obtain among countries that are “closer” in physical, linguistic, cultural or 
historical terms (Mattoo and Fink, 2002). In practice, however, it is notable how the 
broad intersect between domestic regulation and services trade has tended to prove 
intractable (just as it has under the GATS) even among the smaller subset of 
countries engaging in PTAs. 
In many instances, PTAs address domestic regulation in a manner analogous to that 
found in Article VI of the GATS, i.e. with a focus on procedural transparency and 
ensuring that regulatory activity does not lead to unduly burdensome or disguised 
restrictions to trade or investment in services. With the exception of the EU itself and 
of agreements reached between the EU and countries in Central and Eastern Europe 
                                                                                                                                            
Commission to insert disciplines on trade and competition into the EU’s PTAs with 
developing countries. 
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in pre-EU accession mode, no PTA has to date made tangible progress in 
delineating the possible elements of a necessity test aimed at ensuring broad 
proportionality between regulatory means and objectives (as is potentially foreseen 
under the GATS’ Article VI:4 mandate).12  
It is notable that neither the NAFTA nor the many NAFTA-type agreements reached 
in the Western Hemisphere contain an article on domestic regulation per se in their 
services chapters. Rather, such agreements feature more narrowly drawn disciplines 
relating to the licensing and certification of professionals.13  
On most matters relating to rules governing domestic regulation in services trade, 
progress has indeed been greater at the multilateral than at the PTA level. . Such 
progress has been evident in the Doha Round discussions on licensing requirements 
and procedures, qualification requirements and procedures and technical standards, 
transparency and special and differential treatment. Indeed, the disciplines on 
licensing procedures found in a number of recent PTAs entered into by some of the 
members of the ‘Friends of Domestic Regulation’ (the main demandeurs for 
domestic regulation disciples at the multilateral level) reflect the progress made in 
the Doha Round negotiations. For instance, in the China-Singapore FTA, Article 
65:3(a) makes specific provision for applicants to remedy deficiencies in their 
applications. In addition, in cases where an application was either denied or 
terminated, the applicant is afforded the possibility of resubmitting a new application 
at its discretion.14 Similar provisions are found in Article 10:5 of the AANZ FTA and 
Article 111:3 of the New Zealand – China FTA. Although the above provisions on 
licensing procedures in these PTAs do not go as far as the draft Doha Round 
proposals , they offer an interesting illustration of the iterative relationship between 
PTAs and the WTO and of the way in which PTAs can reverse engineer 
developments originating at the multilateral level. The area of domestic regulation is 
one in which an increasing number of PTAs embed existing GATS provisions and 
signal the desire of Members to incorporate by reference the ultimate outcome of 
the ongoing GATS Article VI:4 negotiating mandate. In so doing, PTAs cease to 
assume the role of rule-making laboratories, a trend that is most common in regard 
to the “unfinished agenda” of GATS (with the notable exception of government 
procurement). 
  
 
                                                 
12 See Delimatsis (2008) for a fuller depiction of the state of play of GATS discussions under 
the Article VI:4 work program. 
13 Whereas similar GATS language states that the measures in question should not be a 
restriction to the supply of a service under any of the four GATS modes, the NAFTA-type 
agreements narrow this requirement to the cross-border supply of a service. No comparable 
provision can be found in these agreements’ investment chapters.  
 
14 China-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, Article 65:3(c). 
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Harmonization, mutual recognition and regulatory cooperation 
 
 
With a few notable exceptions, notably the EU and ANZCEPTA, both of which 
involve a level of integration that extends to a common labor market, tangible 
progress on matters of regulatory harmonization or mutual recognition within PTAs 
has generally proven more arduous than might be expected in theory (see Box 2).  
 
Box 2. Harmonization and Mutual Recognition in Services: Promise 
and Pitfalls 
The pessimism that calls for regulatory harmonization often generates is 
based on the absence of widely accepted international standards in services. 
Where such standards do exist, as in financial services or maritime transport, 
meeting them tends to be seen as a first step towards acceptability, rather 
than as a sufficient condition for market access. The GATS, like the GATT, 
does not specifically require the use of international standards. It generally 
provides weaker incentives for the use of such standards than the SPS or the 
TBT Agreements, and does not provide a presumption of compliance as do 
the latter two agreements.15  
It is unlikely that meaningful international standards for most services will be 
developed soon. Still, it bears noting that in those areas where global 
standards do exist, the likelihood of disguised or needlessly restrictive 
impediments to trade and investment may be significantly lower, even as 
overtly discriminatory regulatory barriers or market access impediments 
subject to Articles XVI (Market Access) and XVII (National Treatment)  (and 
typically “reserved” in scheduled sectors) may remain in place. The 
presumption must also be that the existence of such standards may 
significantly facilitate trade (particularly cross-border trade by helping 
overcome the various forms of information asymmetries that hold such trade 
– and its commensurate liberalization under GATS- back) and investment. 
Accordingly, efforts should be directed to ensuring that trade agreements 
create a stronger presumption in favor of genuinely international standards in 
services trade. As with recognition agreements, efforts at developing 
international standards for services trade will likely require greater doses of 
technical assistance and capacity building. This may be usefully done at the 
                                                 
15 Such a presumption can be found in Article 2.5 of the TBT Agreement and Article 3.2 of the 
SPS Agreement.  
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national and regional levels, particularly as proximity, both geographic 
historical, and cultural, may be expected to facilitate regulatory convergence.  
Efforts to promote the adoption of international standards will invariably be 
carried out outside a trade policy framework. Contrary to much popular 
belief, trade agreements are not in the business of making regulatory 
standards. Rather, their remit lies in how such standards are implemented if 
they impact on trade. The relevant institutions for promoting international 
standards for services are to be found in various specialized regulatory 
institutions, such as the Bank for International Settlements for banking 
standards, the International Telecommunications Union for 
telecommunications or the International Standardization Organization (ISO) 
for various categories of services (including the means of producing and 
supplying them).16  
As regards mutual recognition agreements (MRAs), three observations seem 
in order.  First, they cannot be made to happen. Secondly, they do not seem 
to be happening – at least not on any major trade-influencing scale and 
certainly not at the multilateral level. Often touted as a desirable transaction 
cost-reducing alternative to regulatory harmonization, there are in practice 
relatively few examples of successful, operative MRAs in services trade.17 
Thirdly, even if MRAs were to happen in greater numbers, it is unclear 
whether they would always be desirable.   
A multilateral agreement like the GATS cannot mandate countries to 
conclude MRAs – just as any provision such as Article V of GATS (Economic 
Integration) or Article XXIV of GATT cannot make regional integration 
agreements happen. As in the case of regional agreements, multilateral 
disciplines can be more or less permissive with regard to mutual recognition. 
This in turn raises a key question: where and how strong are the incentives to 
conclude MRAs? The practice of MRAs suggests that their scope is often 
quite limited; they are invariably concluded between very similar countries. 
Even in a region with as strong an integrationist dynamic as Europe, and 
despite a significant level of prior and/or complementary  (minimal) regulatory 
harmonization, the effect of MRAs has been limited by the unwillingness of 
                                                 
16 One concrete example of forward movement in international standardisation involving 
developing countries is provided by the IMF-World Bank Comprehensive Financial Sector 
Adjustment Programs, which are helping many jurisdictions to assess their compliance with 
international standards in the financial sector with the aim to help them address any 
underlying weaknesses. Carried out on a voluntary basis outside of the trade policy 
framework, such regulatory cooperation may nonetheless be expected to facilitate the 
progressive, orderly, pursuit of liberalization of trade and investment in financial services. 
 
17 See Beviglia-Zampetti (2000). See also Nicolaidis and Trachtman (2000). 
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many host country regulators to cede full control. It should come as no 
surprise that MRAs have yet to exert significant effects on services trade.  
Such an outcome in turn raises the question of the benefits and costs of 
MRAs.  The analogy with regional integration agreements is here again useful, 
as MRAs can be likened to sector-specific preferential arrangements.  In 
instances where regulatory barriers are prohibitively high - one can imagine 
autarky as the ultimate example - then recognition can only be trade creating.  
But if they are not, then selective recognition can have discriminatory effects 
and lead to trade diversion. The result may well be to create trade according 
to a pattern of mutual trust rather than on the basis of the forces of 
comparative advantage.  For instance, one can readily observe OECD 
countries making progress (albeit limited) towards MRAs in professional 
services, but avoiding such agreements with countries such as India, Egypt 
or the Philippines.   
Article VII (Recognition) of the GATS strikes a delicate balance by allowing 
such agreements, provided third countries have the opportunity to accede or 
demonstrate equivalence.  Thus, Article VII has a desirable open-ended 
aspect that Article V (dealing with integration agreements) does not. This 
makes it particularly worrisome that many MRAs have been notified by WTO 
Members under Article V rather than VII.  In any case, the key concern for any 
multilateral agreement should be not how those who enjoy preferential 
access are treated, but how those who do not enjoy such access are treated.  
Ironically, the only line of defense of the rights of third countries could well 
come from a necessity test aimed at ensuring that such countries would not 
be subject to unnecessarily burdensome regulation even if they were not 
parties to an MRA.  
Because of the potential of MRAs to create trade and investment distortions, 
bilateral or plurilateral recognition agreements should respect the non-
discrimination principle, as mandated by Article VII of GATS. Such 
agreements should not, as a rule, be notified under Article V of GATS 
(Economic Integration) but rather be open to all eligible participants under the 
terms of Article VII. 
Source: Mattoo and Sauvé (2003). 
 
Moreover, even though a number of PTAs call on Members to recognize, at times on 
the basis of explicit timetables , foreign educational credentials and professional 
qualifications in selected professions, progress in concluding mutual recognition 
agreements has often proven slow, difficult, and partial. This is particularly 
noteworthy of agreements pursued between countries with federal political regimes 
and systems of delegated authority to licensing bodies at the sub-national level.  
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Still, compared with progress registered under Article VII (Recognition) of the GATS, 
reliance on the subsidiary approaches afforded by PTAs has allowed some degree 
of tangible progress. Such advances appear more pronounced within South-South 
PTAs such as Mercosul and ASEAN’s Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS), 
both of which have seen the conclusion of mutual recognition agreements in several 
regulated professions (e.g. nurses, engineers, accountants, architects, lawyers).  
Most PTAs feature provisions calling for greater institutional cooperation between 
domestic regulators of parties’ in implementing agreements, typically setting up joint 
regulatory commissions and periodic meetings at senior or ministerial level. The 
benefits of such cooperation, even as it proceeds from soft law undertakings, can 
still yield important trade- and investment-facilitating benefits and help build trust, 
enhance enforcement capacities and identify post-negotiation implementation 
bottlenecks, all of which may be key ingredients – indeed pre-conditions - for 
regulatory harmonization and effective mutual recognition initiatives.  
 
 
Emergency safeguard mechanisms, subsidy disciplines and government 
procurement  
 
With few exceptions, PTAs have made little headway in tackling the key “unfinished” 
rule-making items on the GATS agenda. This is most notably the case for disciplines 
on an emergency safeguard mechanism (ESM) and subsidy disciplines for services 
trade, where governments confront the same conceptual challenges, data 
limitations, feasibility challenges and political sensitivities at the regional level as 
they do on the multilateral front. It bears noting  for instance that the countries of 
Southeast Asia, which until recently counted amongst the most vocal proponents of 
an emergency safeguard mechanism in the GATS, have yet to adopt such a 
provision within their own ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) To 
date, only members of CARICOM (in Protocol II) in the Western Hemisphere, have 
adopted (but not yet used) such an instrument, and questions remain as to the 
operational feasibility and ultimate necessity of an ESM in services trade given the 
flexibilities embedded in the very conduct of market opening under most 
agreements.  
 
The NAFTA has provided one example of sector-specific experimentation (in 
financial services) with safeguard-type measures. Under the terms of the NAFTA’s 
chapter on financial services, Mexico was allowed to impose market share caps if 
the specific foreign ownership thresholds agreed to – 25 and 30 percent respectively 
for banks and securities firms – were reached before 2004. Under the terms of the 
agreement, Mexico could only have recourse to such market share limitations once 
during the 2000-2004 period and could only impose them for a three-year period. 
Under no circumstances could such measures be maintained beyond the end of the 
transition period foreseen for market opening under the NAFTA (e.g. 2001). It bears 
noting that Mexico never made use of such provisions even as the aggregate share 
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of foreign participation in its financial system became significantly higher than the 
thresholds described above (Sauvé, 2002; 2008; Sauvé and Gonzalez-Hermosillo, 
1993). It is interesting, if somewhat surprising, that no further attempt has been 
made, either in PTAs or at the WTO level, to consider the scope for - and practical 
means of - replicating the Mexican financial services example on a sectoral basis in 
areas where market opening may be prone to unanticipated dislocations and have 
potentially injurious consequences for smaller domestic firms, as in distribution for 
instance. The quest for a generic emergency safeguard measure applicable to all 
sectors and predicated on the GATT model has led to a negotiating stalemate at 
both the PTA and WTO levels.18  
 
On the issue of disciplines for service-related subsidies, once more with the 
exception of the EU (including its pre-accession agreements with countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe) and of ANZCEPTA, the quest for rule-making advances 
has proven just as elusive at the PTA than at the WTO level, particularly within 
countries with federal systems of governance given the extent of sub-national policy 
activism (and the concomitant reluctance to take on binding obligations) in this area.  
 
Whereas a number of PTAs (e.g. MERCOSUL) replicate the call, made in GATS, to 
develop future disciplines on subsidies in services trade, the vast majority of PTAs 
covering services specifically exclude subsidy practices from their coverage. 
Paralleling provisions found in GATS, the EFTA-Singapore FTA requires that 
sympathetic consideration be given to requests by a party for consultations in 
instances where subsidy practices affecting trade in services may be deemed to 
have injurious effects. The area of subsidy disciplines, like that of domestic 
regulation, is one where many PTAs signal a desire to incorporate by reference the 
outcome of any agreed outcome from ongoing (but largely stagnant) discussions at 
the WTO level, where important points of discord continue to surround issues of 
definition and scope, considerations of likeness as well as the applicability and 
practical modalities of trade remedies in services trade.19 
 
More progress has been made at the PTA level in opening up government 
procurement markets in services, though this has tended to be achieved through 
negotiations in the area of government procurement per se (as with the WTO’s 
Government Procurement Agreement or GPA) rather than addressed in services 
negotiations.20  
                                                 
18 For a fuller discussion, see Sauvé (2002), Pierola (2008) and Marconini (2005). 
19 For a fuller discussion of the debate over subsidies in services trade, see Sauvé (2002), 
Poretti (2008), and Adlung (2007). 
20 Still, it bears recalling that despite notable progress in PTAs, government procurement 
practices continue in most instances to be the province of discriminatory practices. In the 
case of NAFTA, for instance, despite the fact that the scope of covered purchases was 
quadrupled when compared to the outcome of the 1987 Canada-United States FTA, covered 
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The approach taken in PTAs is for the most part very similar to that adopted in the 
WTO, i.e. non-discrimination among members within the scope of scheduled 
commitments and procedures to enhance transparency and due process. PTAs 
whose members are all parties to the GPA, such as EFTA and the Singapore–Japan 
FTA, specifically mention that the relevant GPA articles apply and most agreements 
concluded in the Western Hemisphere basically replicate GPA disciplines at the 
regional level. However, it bears noting that unlike the GPA, which applies in 
principle to purchases by both state and sub-national governments, the majority of 
PTAs provide for binding government procurement disciplines at the national level 
only (OECD, 2002a).21 
 
 
Investment  
 
One policy domain where PTAs have achieved considerable progress, both in 
terms of rule-making but also that of market opening, is that of investment 
rule-making, where forward movement has not proven possible to date in the 
WTO. Most PTAs feature comprehensive disciplines on the protection and 
liberalization of cross-border activity to which scope exists for investor-state 
arbitration alongside WTO-like state-to-state dispute settlement, together 
with extensive liberalization commitments, most often brokered on a negative 
list basis. Given the central role assumed by investment as the most 
important mode of service supply, such developments are of some 
significance for the operation of services markets and for promoting more 
contestable entry conditions in tem.22 The extent to which PTAs featuring 
comprehensive investment norms might influence the WTO’s evolving 
architecture of rules will very much depend on prospects for crafting a 
multilateral regime for investment. Any such agreement at the WTO level 
would likely raise a number of intractable questions regarding the scope of 
the GATS and notably its coverage of commercial presence as a mode of 
supplying services. Starting with the NAFTA in 1994, a large and growing 
number of PTAs have shown how the treatment of investment in services 
need not be distinguished from that in other sectors subject to trade 
                                                                                                                                            
entities only represented a tenth of North America’s civilian procurement market at the time 
of the Agreement’s entry into force. See Hart and Sauvé (1997).  
21 For a detailed discussion of the treatment of government procurement in PTAs, see the 
chapter by Dawar and Evenett in this volume.   
22 For a fuller discussion of the evolution of international rules on investment, see Beviglia-
Zampetti and Sauvé (2007).  
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disciplines. The issue of preferential advances in investment rule-making is 
taken up by Sébastien Miroudot in Chapter X of this volume. 
 
 
Rules of origin/denial of benefits 
 
A final area of rule-making deserving attention in a discussion of PTAs and 
services trade concerns the issue of rules of origin. Such rules condition who 
ultimately qualifies for preferential treatment under PTAs.  In services 
agreements, this matter is generally addressed under provisions dealing with 
denial of benefits.23  
The literature on rules of origin has focused almost exclusively on 
merchandise trade flows and hence on policies for determining the origin or 
nationality of tangible products. Much less attention has been devoted to the 
increasingly important issue of how to determine the origin of producers, 
which is primarily what the study of rules of origin in services trade and 
investment is concerned with. Since contesting service markets often 
requires the physical presence of suppliers in the territory of consumers, 
either in the form of individual service providers performing cross-border 
transactions on a temporary (i.e. contract) basis or as entities servicing a 
foreign market on the basis of a commercial presence in that market, 
governments that are signatories of trade and investment agreements may 
need to ascertain whether suppliers originate in other countries, with a view 
to extending or denying the benefits foreseen under such agreements. 
Experience shows that rules of origin for services and investment can play a 
significant role in determining the degree to which regional trading 
arrangements discriminate against non-member countries, and hence the 
extent of potentially costly trade and investment diversion. When levels of 
protection differ between participating countries, the effective preference 
granted to a trading partner will depend on how restrictive the applied rule of 
origin is. In the extreme, if one participant has a fully liberalized market, the 
adoption of a liberal rule of origin by the other participants can be likened to 
MFN liberalization, as services and service suppliers can enter or establish 
themselves in the liberal jurisdiction and from there move to – or service – the 
other partner countries.  
From an efficiency perspective, the policy on origin rules for services should 
be to allow for third country service suppliers, particularly those operating 
through a commercial presence (e.g. via Mode 3 entry) to take advantage of – 
                                                 
23 For a fuller discussion of rules of origin in services trade, see Beviglia-Zampetti and Sauvé, 
(2006) 
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and contribute to - the benefits of an integrating area. Under a liberal rule of 
origin for services and investment24 aimed at ensuring that established 
foreign operators are not mere shell companies but conduct substantial 
business operations in the host country market, third country investors and 
service providers can take full advantage of the expanded market 
opportunities afforded by the creation of a PTA by establishing a commercial 
presence within the integration area. Not surprisingly, participants who seek 
to benefit from preferential access to a protected market and deny benefits to 
third country competitors are likely to argue for the adoption of restrictive 
rules of origin. This could be the attitude, in particular, of regionally dominant 
but non-globally competitive service providers towards third-country 
competition within a regionally integrating area.  
The adoption of restrictive rules of origin are permissible under GATS Article 
V:3, which allows  PTAs concluded between developing countries (i.e South-
South PTAs) to restrict the benefits of integration to service suppliers that are 
owned and controlled by citizens of the integrating area. It is not clear 
whether such flexibility serves the development interests of those that use 
them. Several South-South PTAs, notably ASEAN, Mercosul, the Andean 
Pact, the China-Hong Kong or the China-Macau FTAs , have opted for a 
restrictive policy stance in this area. 
The policy stance taken with regard to rules of origin for services and 
investment in a PTA can play an important role promoting or inhibiting access 
to the most efficient suppliers of services. In many service sectors, the most 
efficient (or globally competitive) suppliers will tend to be either developed 
country firms or firms originating outside an integrating area. Accordingly, the 
adoption of rules of origin that restrict benefits to nationals of member states 
can exert detrimental effects by potentially locking in integrating partners into 
sub-optimal patterns of production and consumption. The above problem 
may be compounded, and generate longer-term deadweight losses, to the 
extent that many services, particularly network-based services, involve 
significant location specific sunk costs, such that first movers (even if 
relatively inefficient) can exert long-term dominance and extract monopolistic 
rents. As discussed earlier, the problem with location-specific sunk costs is 
that a country may be stuck with inferior suppliers for a long time even if it 
subsequently liberalizes on an MFN basis. Indeed, because of the importance 
                                                 
24 More restrictive rules of origin conditioning the receipt of preferences may relate to various 
factors, such as local incorporation (such that benefits are denied to branches of third 
country invested entities), place of incorporation or location of headquarters  or ownership 
and control tests aimed at limiting PTA benefits to local juridical persons. Examples of the 
latter can be found under MERCOSUL or the Andean Pact. 
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of sunk costs in many service industries, sequential entry (which preferential 
liberalization with restrictive rules of origin can easily promote) can produce 
very different results from simultaneous entry. If entry is costly, an incumbent 
may indeed be able to fully deter entry, leading to greater market 
concentration and a reduction in consumer welfare.25 
Some measure of solace can therefore be taken from the observation, 
confirmed in this chapter’s sample of reviewed PTAs, that the vast majority of 
preferential agreements have to date adopted the most liberal rule of origin 
for Mode 3 suppliers, whereby any juridical person incorporated in any party 
to an integration agreement and conducting substantial business operations 
therein receives full treaty benefits. 
 
2.2 Modalities of liberalization: negative vs. positive list approaches 
 
Two major approaches towards the liberalization of trade and investment in services 
have been manifest in PTAs and in the WTO: the positive list or “bottom-up” 
approach (typically a hybrid approach featuring a voluntary, positive, choice of 
sectors, sub-sectors and/or modes of supply in which governments are willing to 
make binding commitments together with a negative list of non-conforming 
measures to be retained in scheduled areas), and the negative list or “top-down/list 
it or lose it” approach   
While both negotiating modalities can be made to produce broadly equivalent 
outcomes in liberalization terms, the two approaches can be argued to generate a 
number of qualitative differences of potential significance from both a domestic and 
international governance point of view.26 
While the debate over these competing approaches appears settled in the GATS 
context, it is useful to recall these differences as the issue is still very much alive in a 
PTA context and as WTO Members contemplate the scope that may exist in the 
current negotiations for making possible improvements to the GATS architecture.  
Under a GATS-like, positive (or hybrid) approach to scheduling liberalization 
commitments, countries agree to undertake national treatment and market access 
                                                 
25 For a fuller discussion, see Mattoo and Fink (2002).  
26 The purpose of the ensuing discussion is to note such differences without advocating any 
implicit hierarchy of policy desirability. Both approaches have strengths and weaknesses. 
The governance-enhancing aspects of negative listing have, however, been noted by several 
observers. See, in particular: Sauvé (1996); Snape and Bosworth (1996); World Trade 
Organization (2001); and Stephenson (2002). For a fuller discussion of the good governance 
promoting aspects of PTAs, see Baldwin, Evenett and Low (2009), as well as Chapter 1 of 
this volume.  
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commitments specifying (through reservations in scheduled areas) the nature of 
treatment or access offered to foreign services or foreign service suppliers.27 Under 
such an approach, countries retain the full right to undertake no commitments. In 
such instances, they are under no legal obligation to supply information to their 
trading partners on the nature of discriminatory or access-impeding regulations 
maintained at the domestic level.  
A related feature of the GATS that tends to be replicated in PTAs that espouse a 
bottom-up (hybrid) approach to liberalization is to afford countries the possibility of 
making commitments that do not reflect (i.e. are made below) the regulatory status 
quo (a long-standing practice in tariff negotiations that was replicated in a GATS 
setting). 
The alternative, “top-down” approach to services trade and investment liberalization 
is based upon the concept of negative listing, whereby all sectors and non-
conforming measures are to be liberalized unless otherwise specified in a 
transparent manner in reservation lists appended to an agreement. Non-conforming 
measures contained in reservation lists are then usually liberalized through 
consultations or, as in the GATS, periodic negotiations.  
It is interesting to note that despite the strong opposition that such an approach 
generated when first mooted by a few GATT Contracting Parties during the Uruguay 
Round, the negative list approach to services liberalization has in recent years been 
adopted in a majority of PTAs covering services that have been notified to the WTO 
to date. In the sample of 55 PTAs under review in this chapter, 33 follow a negative 
list approach (60% of the total).  
First used (for trade in services only in the absence of an investment chapter) by 
Australia and New Zealand in ANZCEPTA, the approach was further developed by 
Canada, Mexico and the United States under NAFTA in 1994. Since the NAFTA took 
effect, Mexico played a pivotal role in extending this liberalization approach and 
similar types of disciplines (i.e. right of non-establishment) on services to other PTAs 
it has signed with countries in South and Central America.28 
                                                 
27 Members of MERCOSUL adopted one slightly different version of the positive list approach 
with a view to liberalising services trade within the region. According to MERCOSUL’s 
Protocol of Montevideo on Trade in Services, annual rounds of negotiations based on the 
scheduling of increasing numbers of commitments in all sectors (with no exclusions) are to 
result in the elimination of all restrictions to services trade among the members of the group 
within ten years of the entry into force of the Protocol. The latter has yet to enter into force. 
See Stephenson (2001) and Pena (2000). 
28 The Andean Community has adopted a somewhat different version of the negative list 
approach. Decision 439 on Trade in Services specifies that the process of liberalization is to 
begin when comprehensive (non-binding) national inventories of measures affecting trade in 
services for all members of the Andean Community are finalized. Discriminatory restrictions 
listed in these inventories are to be lifted gradually through a series of negotiations, ultimately 
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This pattern has been replicated in PTAs signed between Central and South 
American countries on one hand and Asian countries on the other hand, particularly 
those involving the region’s most advanced partners, among which Japan, South 
Korea, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore and Chinese Taipei.  
A number of distinguishing features of negative listing can be identified. For one, 
such an approach enshrines and affirms the up-front commitment of signatories 
(subject to reservations) to an overarching set of general obligations. This is currently 
the case under the GATS primarily with respect to the Agreement’s provisions on 
MFN treatment (Article II, with scope for one-time exceptions) and transparency 
(Article III), with most other disciplines applying in an à la carte manner to sectors 
and modes of supply on those terms inscribed in members’ schedules of 
commitments.29 
A second, and perhaps more immediately operational, defining characteristic of 
negative listing lies in its ability to generate a standstill, i.e. to establish a stronger 
floor of liberalization by locking-in the statutory or regulatory status quo. Such an 
approach therefore avoids the GATS pitfall of allowing a wedge to arise between 
applied and bound regulatory or statutory practices.30 An important caveat however 
lies in the propensity of negative list agreements to allow Parties to lodge 
reservations that preserve future regulatory freedom in a manner analogous to 
“unbound” or non-scheduled commitments under the GATS. Here again, however, 
and unlike the GATS which yields no information on the nature of non-conforming 
measures retained in what are typically sensitive sectors, negative list agreements 
oblige signatories to reveal the nature of existing non-conforming measures in such 
reserved sectors. 
The main governance-enhancing feature arising from the adoption of a negative list 
approach is thus the greater level of transparency it can generate if adhered to 
                                                                                                                                            
resulting in a common market free of barriers to services trade within a five-year period set 
out to conclude in 2005. 
 
29 It bears noting however that most PTAs that employ a negative list approach to 
liberalization feature so-called “unbound” reservations, listing sectors in which Members 
wish to preserve the right to introduce new non-conforming measures in future. In many 
PTAs, particularly those modeled on the NAFTA, such reservations nonetheless oblige 
member countries to list existing discriminatory or access-impairing measures whose effect 
on foreign services or service suppliers might in future be made more burdensome. 
30 The suggestion has been made that WTO Members could address this issue in GATS 
without revisiting the Agreement’s negotiating modality by agreeing to a new framework 
provision whose purpose would be to encourage governments to reflect the statutory or 
regulatory status quo in their scheduled commitments (whilst keeping with the voluntary 
nature of such commitments). See Sauvé and Wilkie (2000). 
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properly31 The information contained in reservation lists will be important to 
prospective traders and investors, who value the one-stop shopping attributes of a 
comprehensive inventory of potential restrictions in foreign markets. Such an 
inventory is also likely to benefit home country negotiators, assisting them in 
establishing a hierarchy of impediments to tackle in future negotiations. Such 
information can in turn lend itself more easily to formula-based liberalization, for 
instance by encouraging members to agree to reduce or progressively phase out 
“revealed” non-conforming measures that may be similar across countries (e.g. 
quantitative limitations on foreign ownership in selected sectors).32  
The production of a negative list may also helps to generate a useful domestic policy 
dialogue between the trade negotiating and regulatory communities, thereby 
encouraging countries to perform a comprehensive audit of existing trade- and 
investment-restrictive measures, benchmark domestic regulatory regimes against 
best international practices, and revisit the rationale for, and most efficient means of 
satisfying, domestic policy objectives.33  
A further liberalizing feature found in a number of PTAs using a negative list 
approach to liberalization consists of a ratchet mechanism (Table 2), whereby any 
autonomous liberalization measure undertaken by an PTA member between periodic 
negotiating rounds is automatically reflected in that member’s schedule of 
commitments or lists of reservations. Such a provision typically aims at preventing 
countries from backsliding with respect to autonomously decreed policy changes. It 
may also facilitate the provision of negotiating credit for autonomous liberalization, 
an issue currently under discussion in the GATS context.  
Such provisions are found in many PTAs concluded in the Western Hemisphere 
where, besides the NAFTA, it has been adopted in several PTAs covering services 
and concluded between developing countries. For instance, Article 10 of Andean 
Community Decision 439 on Services applies to all new measures affecting trade in 
services adopted by member countries and does not allow for the establishment of 
new measures that would increase the degree of non-conformity or fail to comply 
with the commitments contained in Article 6 (market access) and Article 8 (national 
treatment) of the Decision. Article 36 of the CARICOM Protocol is also a ‘status quo’ 
                                                 
31 This caveat is important as a number of PTAs, particularly those conducted along North-
South lines, have seen powerful partners reserve all measures of a sub-national nature 
through one sweeping reservation that yields no information on the nature and sectoral 
incidence of non-conforming measures maintained by sub-national governments. Such 
reservations also greatly reduce the potential scope of the PTA in question to the extent that 
in many federal countries, important pockets of services regulation apply at the sub-national 
level. The insurance sector is the United States, or many energy-related services in Canada, 
are cases in point. 
32 See Sauvé (1996), op. cit. 
33 For a fuller discussion of the modalities and uses to which a trade-related regulatory audit 
may be put, see Sauvé (forthcoming) and Sauvé and Marconini (2009). 
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or standstill provision, prohibiting members from introducing any new restrictions on 
the provision of services in the Community by CARICOM nationals.  
A provision of this type can exert positive effects on the investment climate of host 
countries by signaling to foreign suppliers the latter countries’ commitment not to 
reverse the liberalizing course of policy change.34 Such credibility-enhancing 
provisions may be especially important for smaller countries that often find it difficult 
to attract larger doses of foreign direct investment (FDI). 
A recent comprehensive review of East Asian PTA commitments in services 
suggests that some qualification is required for the often-held belief that 
negative listing yields inherently greater transparency.35 Some agreements 
using negative listing provide a clearer road map of existing regulatory 
impediments, whereas others fall short of expected transparency because, as 
noted above, they use sweeping sectoral or mode-specific carve-outs or 
exclude entire categories of measures (such as sub-national measures).36  
Evidence on the impact of negative listing on induced levels of liberalization is 
also mixed. Some parties have reached hybrid list agreements that achieve 
greater liberalization than their negative list agreements with other partners. 
For example, Singapore’s positively listed commitments in its PTA with Japan 
provide significantly greater coverage than its negatively listed commitments 
in its PTA with Australia. However, there is little doubt that done properly, 
negative list agreements may yield important benefits in regulatory 
transparency and by locking in the regulatory status quo.  
Two potential pitfalls arising from the use of negative listing can however be 
identified. First, that such an approach may be administratively burdensome, 
particularly for developing countries. Such a burden may however be mitigated by 
allowing for progressivity in the completion of members’ negative lists of non-
conforming measures.37 The costs of compliance must also be weighted against 
some of the benefits in governance and best regulatory practices described above.  
                                                 
34 See Hoekman and Sauvé (1994) and Stephenson (2001a). 
35 See Fink, C. and M. Molinuevo. 2007. 
36 One troubling example stems from recent PTA practice by the United States, which 
increasingly uses sweeping negative list reservations that exclude all measures affecting 
services at the sub-national level. Recent US PTAs are also notable for excluding Mode 4 
commitments. 
40 In the NAFTA, for instance, sub-national governments were initially given an extra two 
years to complete their lists of non-conforming measures pertaining to services and 
investment. The NAFTA parties subsequently decided not to complete the lists at the sub-
national level, opting instead for a standstill on existing non-conforming measures. 
Compliance with the production of negative lists has similarly been problematic elsewhere in 
the Western Hemisphere, as a number of agreements were concluded without such lists 
being finalized and without firm deadlines for doing so. The inability of “users” to access the 
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A second concern relates to the fact that the adoption of a negative list implies that 
governments ultimately forgo the right to introduce discriminatory or access-
impairing measures in future, including in sectors that do not exist or are not 
regulated at the time of an agreement’s entry into force. 
 
Table 2. Comparing negotiating approaches in services trade 
 
Type of 
approach/ 
Main features 
GATS-like (hybrid 
approach) 
Negative list approach 
General 
description 
Schedule of commitments 
positively list sectors, sub-
sectors and/or modes of 
supply in which 
commitments on market 
access, national treatment as 
well as any additional 
commitments are undertaken 
and negatively lists any non-
conforming treatment or 
measures retained  therein. 
A la carte liberalization – 
members retain the right to 
choose sectors, sub-sectors 
and modes of supply in 
which they are prepared to 
undertake legally-binding 
market access, national 
treatment and any other 
additional commitments. 
Free trade and investment in 
services is assumed unless 
specific existing measures are 
inscribed in reservation lists 
indicating the sector, sub-
sector, industrial 
classification, nature of the 
treaty provision that is 
violated, description of the 
measure in question and the 
nature of the measure’s non-
conformity with regard to 
specific treaty provisions. 
List or lose – all non-
conforming measures not 
notified at the moment of a 
PTA’s entry into force are 
automatically bound at “free” 
(i.e. signatories lose the right 
to invoke non-conforming  
measures that are not 
inscribed in their lists of 
reservations upon an 
agreement’s entry into force). 
Locking in the 
regulatory status 
Not guaranteed unless 
otherwise specified. 
Generally guaranteed. 
                                                                                                                                            
information contained in the negative lists to such agreements deprives the latter of an 
important good-governance promoting feature. 
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quo Members are typically 
allowed to schedule 
commitments below the 
regulatory status quo, 
regardless of the level of 
market openness flowing 
from existing domestic 
regulatory measures. 
Transparency Generally more limited as 
signatories retain the 
flexibility not to schedule 
commitments or to schedule 
commitments below the 
regulatory status quo. 
Generally greater given focus 
on reserving existing non-
conforming measures, but 
some agreements allow 
signatories to lodge sweeping 
reservations (e.g. all non-
confirming measures 
maintained at the sub-
national level). 
Scope for 
introducing 
future non-
conforming 
measures 
Can be secured by either 
leaving a sector, sub-sector 
or mode of supply out of a 
member’s schedule of 
commitments or by 
scheduling an “unbound” 
commitment. 
No information on the nature 
of non-conforming measures 
is generated in non-
scheduled or unbound 
sectors, sub-sectors or 
modes of supply.  
Specific annexes allow 
signatories to a negative list 
PTA to retain future policy 
flexibility in sectors, sub-
sectors or modes of supply. 
These become the GATS 
equivalent of unbound 
measures. Parties are 
normally required to describe 
the current level of non-
conformity prevailing in such 
reserved areas. 
Ratchet 
mechanism 
None Many negative list PTAs 
feature a ratchet provision 
aimed at ensuring that any 
autonomous measure of a 
liberalizing nature enacted 
after a PTA’s entry into force 
or, where envisaged, between 
periodic negotiating rounds, 
becomes the liberalizing 
party’s commitment under the 
PTA, with market opening 
benefits automatically 
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extended to PTA partners.on 
an MFN basis in the case of 
plurilaueral PTAs) 
  
To assuage the latter concerns whilst promoting the transparency-enhancing 
properties associated with the use of negative listing, the suggestion has been made 
to encourage countries (including possibly in the WTO context) to exchange (as they 
have in the Andean Community and are considering doing within MERCOSUL) 
comprehensive (and non-binding) lists of non-conforming measures.38  
In an important new development along the above lines, exemplified in the 
most recent Japanese PTAs, negotiators have sought to secure the best 
properties of negative and hybrid listing. Recent Japanese PTAs thus 
maintain a GATS-like hybrid approach to scheduling, preserving the right of 
countries to pick and choose those sectors, subsectors, and modes of 
supply in which they desire to make commitments. At the same time, the 
country’s PTAs balance this flexibility with the twin obligations to schedule 
the regulatory status quo (that is, there is no GATS-like right to schedule 
commitments that offer less access than that which exists under the 
scheduling country’s current laws and regulations) and  to exchange non-
binding lists of non-conforming measures (that is, a nonbinding negative list 
of trade and investment restrictions in all sectors is embedded in the PTA) so 
as to promote greater regulatory transparency. The EU-CARIFORUM EPA 
took a similar approach in allowing parties to schedule status quo 
commitments on a GATS basis.39 
It bears noting, finally, that PTAs have becoming more flexible and important 
variations are being introduced depending on the negotiating partners. For instance, 
some of Japan’s PTAs (with Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) have 
been conducted along positive list lines, while others take a negative list approach 
(with Chile and Switzerland). PTAs also increasingly mix positive and negative list 
approaches under the same agreement. Recourse to negative listing is particularly 
pronounced in the investment area, whereas some agreements use both 
approaches depending on the sector or mode of supply (e.g. positive listing for 
cross-border trade and negative listing for commercial presence; or negative listing 
for banking services and positive listing for insurance services).  
                                                 
38 See Sauvé and Wilkie (2000) for a fuller depiction of such a proposal. 
39 For a fuller discussion, see Sauvé and Ward (2009), World Bank (2009) and ADB (2009). 
  
Table 3: Key features of PTAs covering services 
Agreements Scope/ 
Coverage 
Negotiating 
modality 
Treatment of investment in 
services 
Right of non 
establishme
nt 
Ratchet 
mechanis
m 
GATS Universal* Positive list 
approach 
Covered as “commercial 
presence” (mode 3)  
No No 
NAFTA Universal* Negative list 
approach 
Separate chapter Yes Yes 
Canada – Chile Universal* Negative list 
approach 
Separate chapter Yes Yes 
Canada – Colombia Universal* Negative list 
approach 
Separate chapter Yes Yes 
Canada – Peru Universal* Negative list 
approach 
Separate chapter Yes Yes 
Chile – Mexico Universal* Negative list 
approach 
Separate chapter Yes Yes 
Bolivia-Mexico Universal* Negative list 
approach 
Separate chapter Yes Yes 
Costa Rica - 
Mexico 
Universal* Negative list 
approach 
Separate chapter Yes Yes 
Mexico – 
Nicaragua 
Universal* Negative list 
approach 
Separate chapter Yes Yes 
Mexico – Northern 
Triangle1 
Universal* Negative list 
approach 
Separate chapter Yes Yes 
Central America – 
Dominican 
Republic 
Universal* Negative list 
approach 
Separate chapter Yes Yes 
Central America – 
Dominican 
Republic – US  
Universal* Negative list 
approach 
Separate chapter Yes Yes 
  
Agreements Scope/ 
Coverage 
Negotiating 
modality 
Treatment of investment in 
services 
Right of non 
establishme
nt 
Ratchet 
mechanis
m 
Central America – 
Chile 
Universal* Negative list 
approach 
Separate chapter Yes Yes 
Chile- Colombia Universal* Negative list 
approach 
Separate chapter Yes Yes 
El Salvador – 
Taiwan  
Universal* Negative list 
approach 
Separate chapter Yes Yes 
Guatemala - 
Taiwan 
Universal* Negative list 
approach 
Separate chapter Yes Yes 
Group of Three Universal* Negative list 
approach 
Separate chapter Yes Yes 
MERCOSUR Universal* Positive list 
approach 
Separate Protocols No No 
Andean 
Community 
Universal* Negative list 
approach 
Covered as “commercial 
presence”  
No No 
CARICOM Universal* Negative list 
approach 
Covered as “commercial 
presence” and in separate 
chapters (on right of 
establishment and movement of 
capital) 
No No 
CARICOM – 
Dominican 
Republic 
Universal* Negative list 
approach 
Separate chapter Yes No 
CARIFORUM – 
European 
Community 
Universal* 
(audio-visual 
services 
explicitly 
excluded)  
Positive list 
approach 
Covered as “commercial 
presence” 
No No 
Central American 
Common Market 
Construction 
services 
Positive list 
approach 
Not specified No No 
  
Agreements Scope/ 
Coverage 
Negotiating 
modality 
Treatment of investment in 
services 
Right of non 
establishme
nt 
Ratchet 
mechanis
m 
EU Universal* Negative list 
approach 
Treated as freedom to establish Yes No 
Europe 
Agreements 
Universal* Negative list 
approach 
Separate chapter Yes No 
EU-Mexico Universal* 
(audio-visual 
services 
explicitly 
excluded) 
Standstill (+ future 
negotiation of 
commitments à la 
GATS) 
Covered as “commercial 
presence” and under a separate 
investment chapter 
No No 
EFTA – Mexico Universal * Positive list 
approach 
Covered as “commercial 
presence” and under a separate 
investment chapter 
No No 
EFTA – Colombia Universal* Positive list 
approach 
Covered as “commercial 
presence” 
No No 
EFTA – Co-
operation Council 
for the Arab States 
of the Gulf 
Universal* Positive list 
approach 
Covered as “commercial 
presence” 
No No 
EFTA – Singapore Universal* Positive list 
approach 
Covered as “commercial 
presence” and under a separate 
investment chapter 
No No 
China – ASEAN  Universal Positive list 
approach 
Covered as “commercial 
presence” 
No No 
China – Singapore  Universal* Positive list 
approach 
Covered as “commercial 
presence” 
No No 
India – Korea  Universal* Positive list 
approach 
Covered as “commercial 
presence” and under a separate 
investment chapter 
No No  
India – Singapore Universal* Positive list 
approach 
Covered as “commercial 
presence” 
No No 
  
Agreements Scope/ 
Coverage 
Negotiating 
modality 
Treatment of investment in 
services 
Right of non 
establishme
nt 
Ratchet 
mechanis
m 
Japan – Chile  Universal* Negative list 
approach  
Separate chapter  Yes Yes 
Japan – Indonesia Universal* Positive list 
approach 
Covered as “commercial 
presence” and under a separate 
investment chapter 
No No 
Japan – Malaysia Universal* Positive list 
approach 
Covered as “commercial 
presence” and under a separate 
investment chapter 
No No 
Japan – Philippines Universal* Positive list 
approach 
Covered as “commercial 
presence” and under a separate 
investment chapter 
No Yes 
Japan – Singapore Universal * Positive list 
approach 
Covered as “commercial 
presence” 
and under a separate investment 
chapter 
No No 
Japan - 
Switzerland 
Universal* Negative list 
approach 
Covered as “commercial 
presence” and under a separate 
investment chapter 
No Yes 
Japan – Thailand  Universal* Positive list 
approach 
Covered as “commercial 
presence”  
No No 
Korea – Singapore Universal* Negative list 
approach 
Separate chapter Yes Yes 
Malaysia – 
Pakistan 
Universal* Positive list 
approach 
Covered as “commercial 
presence” and under a separate 
investment chapter 
No No 
Singapore – Jordan  Universal* Positive list 
approach 
Covered as “commercial 
presence” 
No No 
Singapore - 
Panama 
Universal* Negative list 
approach 
Separate chapter Yes Yes 
Taiwan – Universal* Negative list 
approach 
Separate chapter Yes Yes 
  
Agreements Scope/ 
Coverage 
Negotiating 
modality 
Treatment of investment in 
services 
Right of non 
establishme
nt 
Ratchet 
mechanis
m 
Nicaragua 
ASEAN Framework 
Agreement on 
Services  
Universal* Positive list 
approach 
Covered as “commercial 
presence” and under a separate 
investment chapter 
No No 
ASEAN – Australia 
– New Zealand  
Universal* Positive list 
approach 
Covered as “commercial 
presence and under investment 
No No 
Australia – New 
Zealand Closer 
Economic 
Relations trade 
Agreement 
Universal* Negative list 
approach 
Covered as “commercial 
presence” but no 
common disciplines on 
investment  
Yes No 
New Zealand - 
China 
Universal* Positive list 
approach 
Covered as “commercial 
presence” 
No No 
US – Colombia Universal* Negative list 
approach  
Separate chapter Yes Yes 
US – Jordan Universal* Positive list 
approach 
Covered as “commercial 
presence” 
No No 
US – Oman  Universal* Negative list 
approach 
Separate chapter Yes Yes 
US – Panama Universal* Negative list 
appraoch 
Separate chapter Yes Yes 
US-Singapore Universal* Negative list 
approach 
Separate chapter Yes Yes 
US-Chile Universal* Negative list 
approach 
Separate chapter Yes Yes 
* Air transport and in certain cases cabotage in maritime services is excluded 
1 Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador 
  
3. Assessing the depth of preferential liberalization in services trade 
 
3.1 Overall trends 
The depth of services liberalisation varies considerably across PTAs, with 
differences notable across  sectors, modes of supply, approaches to 
scheduling commitments (i.e. hybrid vs. negative list approaches) as well as 
across country groupings (i.e. North-North, North-South and South-South) 
and partner pairings. While this paper does not attempt a comprehensive 
assessment of the market opening advances achieved in services-related 
PTAs across the sample of agreements under review, it draws on a number of 
important recent contributions to the literature in offering stylized facts about 
the WTO+ nature of PTAs in services trade. 
 
Sequencing 
The sequence of preferential market opening in services rarely, if ever, 
predates preferential talks in goods trade. Countries that engage in services-
related PTAs either pursue such negotiations alongside merchandise trade 
negotiations in a manner analogous to the WTO’s “Single Undertaking” 
approach or pursue services talks sequentially once a PTA in goods trade has 
been agreed. The latter approach is more common among South-South 
PTAs, whereas agreements involving OECD countries typically espouse the 
Single Undertaking route.  
Countries preferring sequential liberalization may wish to test the waters in 
goods trade first, raising comfort levels with new trading partners. They may 
also wish to limit the scope for bargaining across several policy areas that 
comes from WTO-type negotiations, though such a choice may well constrain 
negotiations given the greater narrowness of the negotiating remit. Sequential 
liberalization may also allow partners to identify key services inputs and 
address potential service sector bottlenecks holding back trade in 
manufactured products or primary commodities. The greater degree of 
liberalization achieved to date under North-South PTAs, particularly those 
based on a negative list approach, helps explain why PTAs predicated on a 
Single Undertaking approach have tended to entail greater levels of market 
opening.  
The fact that PTAs have achieved significant progress in market opening 
terms when compared to the GATS should come as no surprise when one 
considers that the WTO commitments under GATS are those brokered in the 
early 1990’s and, in the case of telecommunications and financial services 
(where most progress was made), in 1997. The vast majority of services-
related PTAs were concluded after the entry into force of the GATS. Such 
agreements have taken advantage both of rising comfort levels afforded by 
the pedagogical journey undertaken during the Uruguay Round, from the 
rising level of services-specific trade-related technical assistance dispensed 
at both the multilateral and PTA levels in the post-Uruguay Round period as 
well as the far-reaching degree of unilateral liberalization in services markets 
that characterized the period and which the WTO-GATS has yet been able to 
catch-up to and consolidate. A more analytically meaningful comparison is 
thus the one that can be made between the level and nature of PTA 
commitments and that of negotiating offers made by WTO Members in the 
ongoing Doha Development Agenda (despite the tactical considerations that 
  
my well hold back services offers in a round that has placed agriculture and 
NAMA squarely at the centre of discussions). 
 
3.2 How much further than the WTO? 
If  one can safely assume that the PTAs of today have taken services 
liberalization further than the situation prevailing at the end of the last round 
of multilateral negotiations, there are nonetheless marked differences in 
outcomes that bear noting, Using a sample of 28 PTAs concluded among 29 
WTO Members, Roy, Marchetti and Lim (2008) depict differences in the level 
of commitments scheduled under GATS on Modes 1 (cross-border supply) 
and 3 (commercial presence), those flowing from GATS offers made (as of 
January 2008) under the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda, as well as under 
PTAs. The results, summarized in Chart 1 below, offer a measure of the 
prevailing gap between preferential and multilateral liberalization in services 
trade across the two leading modes of supplying services. 40 
Chart I shows that the average level of sub-sectors bound in the prevailing 
GATS schedules is rather low (31% for mode 1 and 44% for mode 3), 
reflecting the negotiating precaution that characterized the first ever 
multilateral negotiation in the services field. Chart I further reveals that DDA 
offers have not modified this landscape in a dramatic fashion (moving up 7 
percentage points to 38% for mode 1 and up 9 points to 53% for mode 3 
trade).  The value-added of PTAs, which is illustrated by the striped part of 
the bar, is significant.  For Mode 1, such coverage reaches 73% on average, 
almost doubling that achieved by the latest DDA offers. For commercial 
presence, it reaches 85%, almost doubling the average proportion of sectors 
covered by existing GATS commitments and still significantly higher what has 
been offered in the DDA to date. 
 
                                                 
40 The PTAs reviewed in the paper are the following: New Zealand-Singapore; EFTA-Mexico; 
EC-Mexico; Chile-Costa Rica; Japan-Singapore; Singapore-Australia; US-Chile; US-
Singapore; Chile-El Salvador; Korea (Rep.)-Chile; EC-Chile; EFTA-Singapore; China-Hong 
Kong, China; China-Macao, China; EFTA-Chile; US-Australia; Thailand-Australia; Panama-El 
Salvador; Japan-Mexico; US-Bahrain; US-Oman; US-Central America and Dominica 
Republic; US-Morocco; US-Peru; Japan-Malaysia; Korea (Rep.)-Singapore; US-Colombia; 
Singapore-India.  This sample includes agreements signed but not yet implemented or 
notified to the WTO at the time of writing. In computing sector coverage, Roy, Marchetti and 
Lim looked at the best commitments undertaken by each country across any of its 
agreements. The EU-15 is counted as one.  Macao and Hong Kong's commitments are not 
computed. In their paper, Roy, Marchetti and Lim focus on Modes 1 and 3, which represent 
more than 80% of world services trade.  
  
CHART 1: Sector Coverage of PTAs in comparison with GATS 
Offers and GATS Schedules
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Source: Roy, Marchetti and Lim (2008). 
 
Investigating the WTO+ nature of PTA advances on Mode 3 (commercial 
presence) – by far the most important means of accessing services markets – 
the work of Roy, Marchetti and Lim (2008) further reveals significant variance 
across country groupings. The extent of such variance is shown in Table 4 
below. While there is considerable diversity in terms of additional sector 
coverage in PTAs for individual countries, PTAs are found to go beyond 
existing GATS commitments and DDA offers across all country groupings. 
The PTA-induced ‘jump’ in sector coverage for developing countries is much 
larger than for developed countries, as the latter had higher sectoral coverage 
levels to start with under their GATS schedules.   
Table 4 further highlights sizable differences in Mode 3 liberalization patterns 
obtaining between agreements pursuing hybrid and negative-list approaches 
to liberalization, with far greater commitments scheduled under the former. It 
also shows that PTAs conducted along North-South lines achieve deeper 
liberalization than those involving South-South partnerships. Such a result is 
broadly commensurate with the continued dominance of OECD countries in 
world services trade and investment even as a growing number of developing 
countries are fast acquiring significant levels of comparative advantage 
across a wide range of sectors. Such findings may also confirm the superior 
negotiating leverage that large countries have in preferential confines relative 
to what is possible at the WTO level.  
 
  
Table 4: Average Percentage of Sub-Sectors Subject toMarket Access 
Commitments on Mode 3, Selected Country Groupings 
 GATS With GATS 
DDA offer 
With PTA Δ vs best 
WTO 
treatment 
ALL 44% 53% 85% 32% 
Developing 
Countries 
36% 46% 86% 40% 
Developed 
Countries 
67% 74% 82% 8% 
Hybrid Listing 57% 66% 69% 3% 
Negative Listing 37% 47% 93% 46% 
US PTA partner 30% 39% 93% 54% 
Not US PTA 
Partner 
56% 66% 76% 10% 
 
Source: Roy, Marchetti and Lim (2008); amended by authors 
Several PTAs, particularly (but not only) those negotiated along South-South 
lines, show a tendency to only marginally deepen liberalisation commitments 
beyond the GATS. This raises serious questions about their very rationale, all 
the more so when signatories resort to the GATS framework for rule-making 
purposes without attempting to craft new or PTA-specific rules to govern 
services trade and investment among them.41 
One factor that clearly influences the level of commitments undertaken in 
services-related PTAs is the economic importance of the trading partners 
involved.  Roy, Marchetti and Lim (2008) and Marchetti and Roy (2008) show 
how the United States invariably secures greater commitments from its 
trading partners than the commitments such countries are willing to 
undertake in PTAs with other trading partners (including other OECD country 
partners). Marchetti and Roy (2008) argue that such a finding can be traced to 
a mix of political influence and foreign policy factors, and the relative 
importance of the US market for its trading partners' key goods exports (such 
                                                 
41 Such a sample would include, for instance, EFTA countries, India, the European 
Communities (prior to the EPA with CARIFORUM and, to some extent, the EU-Chile FTA), or 
the ASEAN countries (other than Singapore). In some particular cases, these more limited 
advances may be due to the fact that PTA negotiations took place before the last DDA offer, 
such that what was conceded in the PTA may later find its way into a revised  GATS offer.  
  
as in the case of the Central American countries, the Dominican Republic or 
the Andean countries). 
 
Sectoral and modal patterns 
Turning to sectoral patterns of liberalization, the available empirical evidence 
attests to significant WTO+ advances across the full range of traded services. 
Using an index that ranks scheduled commirments using a scale from 1 to 
100, Marchetti and Roy (2008) show how PTAs have registered far-reaching 
advances in comparison to GATS commitments and DDA offers across all 
sectors (see Table 5 below). This includes both sectors that have attracted 
less commitments and DDA offers under the GATS - for example audiovisual 
services - as well as those that have generally proven more attractive in a 
multilateral setting, such computer, tourism or telecom services.   
 
Table 5. Comparing GATS Commitments, GATS DDA Offers, and 'Best' 
PTAs Commitments Across All Members Reviewed, per Selected Sector 
Grouping 
 
SECTORS GATS GATS DDA 
OFFERS 
PTAs 
Professional   30 39 67 
Computer  55 74 93 
Postal-Courier 14 20 53 
Telecom 51 58 80 
Audiovisual  17 20 50 
Construction  40 46 75 
Distribution 32 41 76 
Education 18 25 57 
Environmental  20 30 62 
Financial 36 40 53 
Health 8 11 34 
Tourism 51 61 83 
Maritime 12 23 57 
Rail 14 20 52 
Road  16 18 56 
Auxiliary 
Transport 
21 24 58 
 
Note: Scores for Modes 1 and 3 are combined.  Scale of 1 to 100. On 
the basis of best (most liberalizing) PTA commitments. 
Source: Marchetti and Roy (2008).   
 
With the notable exception of land transportation issues, where physical proximity 
stands out as a determinative trade facilitating feature driving the cross-border 
liberalization process, PTAs continue to encounter resistance in opening up those 
service sectors that have proven difficult to address at the multilateral level. Most 
PTAs thus tend to exclude the bulk of air transportation services (with the notable 
exception of the EU for intra-EU traffic) from their coverage as well as a broad swath 
of public services.  
  
Relatively limited progress – though still WTO+ in most areas - has similarly been 
achieved in PTAs in sectors where particular policy sensitivities arise, such as 
maritime transport and audio-visual services, energy services and to some extent 
(though more so for some countries than others) on the movement of service 
suppliers. Other sectors that generally fit this overall pattern include postal and 
courier services (though not express delivery), health and education services.  
A contrario, PTAs have proven useful settings in which to advance liberalization 
prospects in market segments characterized by rapid technological and commercial 
change. The area of e-commerce or so-called “digital trade”, encompassing a broad 
range of business and IT-related services, which was not yet a commercial reality at 
the time of the Uruguay Round, is one prominent example (See Box 3 below).  
Box 3. PTAs and Digital trade  
 
PTAs increasingly reflect the growing electronic cross-border delivery of 
services and digital products (e.g. software) by incorporating trade rules for e-
commerce.  
What started with the incorporation of a non-binding E-commerce Chapter in 
the US-Jordan PTA in 2000subseuently led to the conclusion of the first 
legally binding US E-commerce Chapter in bilateral trade agreements in the 
US-Singapore FTA of 2003 and to a further flurry of US-led bilateral PTAs 
incorporating E-commerce Chapters that are subject to dispute settlement 
provisions. But the trend has spread further with PTAs such as Singapore-
Australia, Thailand-Australia, India-Singapore, and other containing digital 
trade rules . Other PTAs (Maghreb Arab Union state, India-Thailand, Japan-
Mexico, Japan-Asean, India-ASEAN, China-ASEAN, etc.) and trade-related 
statements from APEC and cooperation agreements also increasingly contain 
binding and non-binding pledges related to ICTs and e-commerce. The PTAs 
are thus functioning as a laboratory for digital trade rules with a 
demonstration effect which is potentially useful for future multilateral or other 
preferential trade negotiations.  
E-commerce Chapters with a focus on digital products 
E-commerce chapters of PTAs following the "US template" formalize a 
definition of digital content products, confirm the applicability of WTO trade 
rules to e-commerce, the applicability of provisions on cross-border trade in 
services apply to electronically supplied services, assure a clear zero-duty 
rate on the content of digital trade and provide for non-discrimination and 
MFN treatment for digital products such as music, films, software (Table 1). 
Interestingly from the point of view of rules of origin, in this template digital 
products must not be fully created and exported via one of the contracting 
parties of the respective PTA to benefit from non-discrimination or MFN. 
Cross-Border Trade in Services Chapters geared towards electronic 
trade 
The Cross-Border Trade in Services Chapters of newly agreed US-led PTAs 
also innovate to the benefit of the digital delivery of services. The PTAs use a 
negative list approach to schedule service trade commitments. Assuming that 
no reservations are made, this top-down approach guarantees that narrow or 
outdated classification schemes and uncertainties relating to the mode of 
delivery do not limit the applicability of commitments to digitally-delivered 
  
services. Importantly the PTAs specify that ‘[n]either Party may require a 
service supplier of the other Party to establish or maintain a representative 
office or any form of enterprise, or to be resident, in its territory as a condition 
for the cross-border supply of a service.". MFN exemptions are not possible. 
Again the devil is in the detail as attention must be paid to specified non-
conforming measures (e.g. in the case of US-led PTAs US state level 
regulation are sometimes listed as exception). On the side of services rules, 
the PTAs introduce strengthened transparency requirements, sector-specific 
mutual recognition annexes (for example for professional services) and 
binding rules on domestic regulation useful for digital trade.  
"Deep" digital trade rules 
Two other developments in PTAs foster digital trade rules: 
Non-binding Joint Understandings on e-commerce calling for liberal 
digital trade principles and rules fostering the diffusion of ICTs and e-
commerce. A number of PTAs  spell out a cooperation agenda on various 
aspects of the information society but in particular in areas such as: 
telecommunications policy, ICT standards / conformity assessments, 
interconnection / interoperability issues, cyber-security, electronic signatures, 
the balance between privacy protection and the free cross-border flow of 
information, intellectual property rights, consumer confidence in e-commerce, 
etc. 
Incorporation of ‘deep integration’ digital trade principles as an integral 
component of bilateral trade agreements and sometimes also subject to 
the dispute settlement provisions. Such ‘deep’ digital trade provisions can 
be found relating to the following topics: domestic regulation, transparency, 
consumer protection, data protection, authentication and digital signatures, 
and paperless trading . 
Source: Wunsch-Vincent (2008).  
 
Market-opening advances are also notable in sectors where new, post-Uruguay 
Round, pro-liberalization constituencies have emerged seeking to use trade 
agreements to secure expanded opportunities in world markets. This is notably the 
case of express delivery services, which feature prominently in a number of recent 
PTAs. Similarly, new areas of financial services, such as asset management or 
financial services delivered through electronic means; trade in some segments of 
higher education and related services (e.g. vocational training and educational 
testing); as well as the wellness industry situated at the interface of tourism and 
health services, are all receiving greater attention in many recent preferential 
agreements, including those brokered along South-South lines.  
In some cases, market opening advances rest on a complementary set of new 
disciplines. Such a trend is most visible in the field of investment, where PTAs have 
achieved significant forward movement over the WTO. It is also notable in the area of 
procurement liberalization. A further example of the close nexus between market 
opening and novel (pro-competitive) rule-making can be found in the tourism sector, 
where the EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement recently blazed a new 
trail (see Box 4). It is possible that many such advances could be replicated at the 
WTO level in the Doha Round or beyond, all the more so as most of them are 
actively being discussed in ongoing negotiations under the GATS and have been the 
object of collective requests advanced by various coalitions of like-minded WTO 
Members. 
  
 
Box 4. Tourism liberalization  in the CARIFORUM-EU EPA 
 
The tourism sector stands out as one in which developing countries possess 
clear comparative advantages in services trade. Accordingly, several 
developing country governments have for some time been clamoring for 
provisions in trade agreements dedicated to the sector and its specificities. 
Such calls led to the formulation of a draft GATS Annex on tourism services 
during the course of the Doha Round and to the formulation of a collective 
request sponsored by a majority of developing country members of the WTO, 
several of which from the Caribbean region. The collective inability of WTO 
Members to complete the Doha Round has so far stymied progress in this 
area. Not surprisingly, proponents of tourism trade liberalization took their 
case to subsidiary settings. 
The CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership Agreement concluded in 2008 
offered a natural setting for testing out several of the ideas advanced in the 
submissions described above and to seek to advance negotiations in a sector 
of clear offensive interest to the developing country partner. PTA advances in 
this case offer the interesting example of reverse engineering by adapting 
proposals or draft rules initially targeted at the WTO level. The precedent set 
in the EPA is likely to inform the treatment of tourism in other PTAs involving 
developing countries as well as at the WTO level, be it in the Doha 
Development Agenda or beyond.  
Initially, CARIFORUM Members had proposed the inclusion of a distinct 
tourism annex in the EPA. The origins of this seems to have been the WTO 
Doha Round proposal submitted by Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Venezuela in 
2001.42 The latter proposal was the inspiration for the draft text on tourism 
which was formulated by the Caribbean Hotel and Tourism Association and 
adopted by the Caribbean Regional Negotiation Machinery in the EPA 
context.  
(i) Mutual recognition 
On the question of the negotiation of a mutual recognition agreement (MRA) 
for tourism service providers, the EPA provides that “the Parties shall co-
operate towards the mutual recognition of requirements, qualifications, 
licenses or other regulations in accordance with Article 85….”43 Article 85, 
which deals with mutual recognition more generally, reaffirms the Parties’ 
right to require that natural persons possess the necessary qualifications 
and/or professional experience to supply covered services; commits the 
Parties to encourage the relevant professional bodies in their respective 
territories to jointly develop and provide recommendations on mutual 
recognition to the CARIFORUM-EC Trade and Development Committee to 
determine the criteria to be applied by the Parties for the authorization, 
licensing, operation and certification of investors and services suppliers. 
Tourism is identified as one of the priority sectors for the development of 
                                                 
42 World Trade Organization, “Communication by Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Venezuela: Draft Annex on Tourism,” 
S/CSS/W/107, September 26, 2001. 
43 EC-CARIFORUM EPA, Article 114. 
  
mutual recognition arrangements under the Agreement.44 The EPA specifically 
mandates the EC and CARIFORUM to encouraging (i.e. a hortatory, or “best 
endeavors” commitment) their relevant professional bodies in their respective 
territories to start negotiations three years after the EPA’s entry into force in 
order to jointly develop and provide recommendations on mutual recognition.  
(ii) Competition policy disciplines 
One important element of the Doha Development Agenda proposal which the 
Caribbean Hotel and Tourism Association maintained in its EPA draft was the 
creation of a competitive safeguard for tourism.45 The inclusion of disciplines 
on anti-competitive practices was of key importance to CARIFORUM states 
as the global tourism industry is characterized by vertically integrated market 
structures and consolidated distribution channels controlled by a limited 
number of large international players,46 many of which are based in the EU. 
Specifically, in accordance with Chapter 1 of Title IV dealing with competition 
policy, Article 111 EPA compels the parties to maintain or introduce measures 
to prevent suppliers from materially affecting 'the terms of participation in the 
relevant market for tourism services by engaging in or continuing anti-
competitive practices, including, inter alia, abuse of dominant position 
through imposition of unfair prices, exclusivity clauses, refusal to deal, tied 
sales, quantity restrictions or vertical integration.' The EPA provision on the 
prevention of anti-competitive practices is legally binding.47  
(iii) Trade-related capacity building 
Also notable in the EPA’s treatment of tourism services is the fact that the 
sector features distinct development co-operation provisions, in contrast to 
other sectors where such issues are addressed in a generic manner. The EPA 
puts forward an explicit commitment on the part of the EC to help in the 
advancement of the tourism sector in the CARIFORUM states and sets out a 
non-exhaustive list of specific areas in which the Parties agree to co-operate. 
This includes capacity building for environmental management, the 
development of internet-based marketing strategies for small and medium 
sized tourism enterprises, as well as the upgrading of national accounts 
systems with a view to facilitating the introduction of tourism satellite 
accounts48 at the regional and local level. 
                                                 
44 EC-CARIFORUM EPA, Article 85 (3). 
45 Incidentally, it is worthy of note that the EC’s reaction to Dominican Republic’s Doha 
Development Agenda proposal was to support the main intentions of the proposal, while not 
explicitly endorsing the Tourism Annex to the GATS. However, the EC signaled that two 
issues in the draft- tourism and sustainable development and competitive safeguards- 
merited further consideration. See Dunlop, “Tourism Services Negotiations Issues,” 10.  
46 CRNM, “The Treatment of Tourism in the CARFORUM-EC Economic Partnership 
Agreement,” 2. 
47 By contrast, the other provisions in the Section 7, which addresses the tourism sector, are 
non-binging. For a fuller discussion of the treatment of tourism under the EPA, see Sauvé and 
Ward (2009), The EC-CARIFORUM Partnership Agreement: Assessing the Outcome on 
Services and Investment.” ECIPE Discussion Paper. Brussels: European Centre for 
International Political Economy. Available at: http://www.ecipe.org/publications/ecipe-
working-papers/the-ec-cariform-economic-partnership-agreement-assessing-the-outcome-
on-services-and-investment. 
48 A Tourism Satellite Account (TSA) is a statistical instrument to analyse the economic 
importance of tourism. According to the European Commission, 'a complete TSA contains 
detailed production accounts of the tourism industry and their linkages to other industries, 
  
Sources: Sauvé and Ward (2009, 2009a). 
 
The sectoral patterns of PTA-induced market opening in services trade 
described above appear to hold at the regional level. This is evidenced for 
instance in the work of Fink and Molinuevo (2007), which offers an 
aggregated measure of the GATS+ nature of market opening commitments in 
a sample of service-related PTAs concluded among Asian countries (see 
Charts 2 below for a depiction of sectoral advances). Such findings reveal 
that while GATS+ advances are significant across all sectors, they are 
particularly noticeable in the areas of business services (reflecting the 
emergence of digital trade, e-commerce and the outsourcing revolution in 
services); distribution; education, health and transport services, all areas that 
have proven difficult in the WTO context during the Uruguay Round and in the 
more recent context of the Doha Development Agenda.   
Meanwhile, the lesser relative progress registered in areas such as 
telecommunications and financial services in the South-East Asian context 
recalls that these are precisely the sectors where GATS negotiations have to 
date been most successful. This may well lessen the scope or perceived need 
for significant new advances in a PTA context. This is so even as both sectors 
are ones in which PTAs, in Asia and beyond, have continued to reap market 
opening advances relative to conditions prevailing at the end of 1997 when 
both the Agreement on Basic Telecommunications and the Financial Services 
Agreement were completed in a GATS setting. 
Using the Fink-Molinuevo methodology and applying it to the four largest 
members of CARIFORUM in the context of the EU-EPA, Sauvé and Ward 
(2009) reveal a broad pattern of WTO+ or WTO-X advances arising at the 
preferential level (see Annex Charts 1 to 4).  
 
                                                                                                                                             
employment, capital formation and additional non-monetary information on tourism. See 
online at http://www.unwto.org/statistics/index.htm and 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/services/tourism/tourism_satellite_account.htm. 
  
Chart 2. GATS+ advances in East Asian PTAs: sectoral breakdown 
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Source: Fink and Molinuevo (2007). 
The East Asian PTA experience depicted in Fink and Molinuevo (2007) 
confirms the partial, incremental, nature of market opening in services trade. 
Such an observation is particularly apparent when commitments are analysed 
on a modal basis (see Chart 3 below). From a positive (albeit not entirely 
surprising point of view given the reluctance of countries to contemplate 
Mode 4 liberalization on an MFN basis in the WTO), the most significant 
sources of GATS+ advances in East Asian PTAs relate to the two modes of 
supply likely to generate the strongest developmental returns: mode 4 
(movement of natural persons) – the least committed of all modes under 
GATS – and mode 3 (commercial presence) – the most committed of all 
modes subject to GATS bindings and the principal means through which 
services are traded internationally.49 
                                                 
49 One example drawn from the Asian experience relates to the labour mobility provisions 
found in recent Japanese PTAs, which feature novel provisions aimed at assisting partner 
countries with training in the home country prior to their admission as professionals in the 
Japanese labour market with a view to complying with Japanese licensing requirements in 
nursing and other health-related occupations. While the numerical quotas agreed by Japan in 
these areas remain low relative to the supply capacity (and negotiating interests) of sending 
countries, such provisions nonetheless represent a step forward in the treatment of Mode 4 
issues in a context of population ageing and labour market shortages in OECD countries.   
  
Chart 3.  GATS+ advances in East Asian PTAs : modal breakdown 
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Source: Fink and Molinuevo (2007). 
As obtains in other preferential settings and at the WTO level, the East Asian 
PTA experience reveals lesser preferential advances in regard to Modes 1 
(cross-border supply) relative to Mode 3 (commercial presence).This reflects 
the generally greater precaution shown towards transactions which many 
host countries feel they cannot (or cannot easily) regulate.  
  
Evidence of iterative learning by doing 
The relationship between PTAs and the WTO is not unidirectional in character but 
involves iterative, two-way, interaction between the two layers of trade governance in 
ways that can inform, subsequent patterns of rule-making and market opening at 
both the PTA and WTO levels. Examples of such interaction can notably be found in 
areas where WTO jurisprudence has clarified or interpreted the scope of key 
provisions governing services trade that are typically found both in the WTO-GATS 
and in the services and investment chapters of PTAs. Baptisto (2009), for instance, 
has found evidence of NFATA-minus treatment of recreational services in the 
reservation lists of the United States following the decision of the WTO’s Dispute 
Settlement and Appellate (DSB and AB) bodies in the area of online gambling (United 
States-Gambling Services). Similarly, the most recent DSB and AB decisions in the 
China - Publications and Audiovisual Products dispute has already prompted some 
observers to note the need for China to adjust its future PTA commitments with a 
view to ensuring the preservation of adequate policy space with which to pursue 
cultural policy objectives (Shi and Chen, forthcoming).  
The co-existence of hard and soft law provisions 
A final, salient, trend emerging from the most recent generation of PTAs that has 
both a rule-making and market opening dimension concerns the increasing reliance 
that is made, particularly in agreements brokered by the EC, on a set of non-binding 
provisions embedded in PTAs alongside treaty provisions that are legally binding and 
enforceable.  
Advances of this type reflect the ever-broadening remit of trade rule-making and the 
commensurate desire of Parties to assign to regulatory cooperation a number of 
trade- and investment- facilitating  roles. For various reasons, such PTA advances 
may well be limited to preferential settings and encounter difficulties in ‘migrating’ to 
the WTO. This may notably the case where Parties harbour concerns over MFN-
induced free riding, where particular policy sensitivities arise at the WTO level that 
can nonetheless be contained or addressed in a PTA setting, or where Parties may 
simply not deem binding and enforceable obligations a desirable outcome. The area 
of cultural cooperation (see Box 5) would appear to correspond to the former 
category of policy domains while that of aid for trade and its design in the services 
field likely falls more squarely within the latter category (see Box 6). 
Box 5. Cultural cooperation in the EU-CARIFORUM EPA 
A novel feature of the CARIFORUM EPA is its inclusion of a Protocol on 
Cultural Co-operation between the Parties. The Protocol establishes a clear 
precedent in addressing matters relating to cultural industries within PTAs, 
laying the basis for the inclusion of similar provisions in other EPAs. The 
inclusion of language on cultural cooperation matters marks a significant 
evolution in EU attitudes towards the subject matter in a trade policy context, 
hitherto marked by a desire to preserve maximum policy autonomy by 
eschewing any commitments in trade agreements and, in the case of the 
DDA, by refusing to direct negotiating requests to its trading partners and to 
entertain offers in response to trading partner requests in cultural industries. 
The advances made in the Protocol respond to CARIFORUM members’ 
strong offensive interests in this area, notably the music industry. 
The EPA Protocol establishes a framework within which the Parties can co-
operate with a view to facilitating exchanges of cultural activities, goods and 
services, the movement of artists and other cultural professionals and to 
  
improving cinematographic cooperation between the Parties The protocol 
can be viewed as the first concrete response to Article 16 of the UNESCO 
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions dealing with preferential treatment. According to CARIFORUM 
officials, the conclusion of co-production agreements, which the protocol 
calls for, will make it possible for Caribbean audiovisual producers to access 
new sources of funding for creative projects. Given the EC’s longstanding 
sensitivities in the audio-visual sector, the Protocol likely represents as close 
to new market access opportunities as the EC’s EPA partners could have 
hoped for without actually resulting in new liberalization commitments on 
national treatment or market access.  
Source: Sauvé and Ward (2009) 
 
 
Box 6. Aid for Trade in Services: Co-operation & Financing for 
Development in the EU-CARIFORUM EPA  
 
The co-operation elements of the EU-CARIFORUM EPA respond to the aim of 
EU Members to infuse the Agreement with a concrete development 
dimension. In so doing, the EPA charts useful new territory at a time when the 
multilateral community is struggling to give operational meaning to the 
concept of Aid for Trade.   
The EPA text does not feature explicit language on the level of development 
financing made available overall nor does it spell out the specific issues and 
sectors subject to the Agreement’s coverage.  This has sparked much 
criticism throughout the CARIFORUM region over the alleged unbalanced 
nature of the Agreement insofar as its development provisions remain 
somewhat abstract and not legally enforceable while its liberalization 
commitments are up-front, legally binding and enforceable. Responding to 
such critiques, the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM), which 
led the negotiations on the CARIFORUM side, cautioned that “any 
perceptions about the EPA’s practical deficiencies with respect to the 
treatment of development and development cooperation and assistance 
should first be tempered by the recognition that as a trade agreement, the 
EPA should not be perceived to be the primary vehicle through which 
development may be achieved.”50 Rather, it should be considered as “one 
strategic instrument in a range of economic development strategies.”51    
According to the Joint Declaration on Development Co-operation, which is 
annexed to the EPA and constitutes an integral part of it, a package of €165 
million has been set aside for the six years following the Agreement’s entry 
into force to fund activities identified and rank-ordered in the Caribbean’s 
regional indicative plan (RIP).    
In addition to funding for the regional indicative plan, each CARIFORUM state 
will receive funds for its national indicative plans (NIP) but must identify two 
priority projects for such additional funding. The Dominican Republic and 
                                                 
50 CRNM, ‘RNM Update 0802’, electronic newsletter, available online at 
http://www.crnm.org/documents/updates_2008/rnmupdate0802.htm., accessed 19 April 
2008. 
51 Ibid. 
  
Jamaica announced that they would be using some of the financing under 
their respective NIPs for purposes of EPA implementation.   
The minimum cost of implementing the EPAs provisions on Investment, Trade 
in Services and E-Commerce and addressing the capacity constraints at the 
national and regional levels has been estimated at €15.6 million.52  Key areas 
concerned include the building of regulatory capacity, overcoming 
information asymmetries in order to assist CARIFORUM firms and entities to 
identify business opportunities in the European market and the development 
of productive capacity in goods and cultural services.     
Specific technical assistance efforts are to be directed at the following 
objectives: (i)  improving the ability of CARIFORUM service suppliers to gather 
information on and meet regulations and standards of the EC Parties; (ii) 
improving the export capacity of local service suppliers; (iii) facilitating 
interaction and dialogue between service suppliers of both Parties; (iv) 
addressing quality and standards in needs in those areas where the 
CARIFORUM states have undertaken commitments; (v) developing and 
implementing regulatory regimes for specific services at the CARIFORUM 
level and in the signatory CARIFORUM states; (vi) establishing mechanisms 
for promoting investment and joint ventures between service suppliers of the 
Parties; and (vii) enhancing the capacities of investment promotion agencies 
in CARIFORUM states.53  
Source: Sauvé and Ward (2009). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
52 CARICOM Secretariat, “Implementation of the CARIFORUM-EC Economic Partnership 
Agreement.” (Georgetown: CARICOM Secretariat, 2008), 10.  The constraints identified 
include insufficient numbers of specialists and experts; limited human resources, both within 
the public and private sectors; the absence of an organized Services sector body through 
which the stakeholders can be mobilized; general absence of infrastructure; and the 
inadequacy of financial resources.   
53 Ibid., Article 121 (2). 
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ANNEX 
 
TABLE 1. LIST OF PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS (PTAS) THAT INCLUDE 
PROVISIONS ON TRADE IN SERVICES 
 
Number Agreement Type 
1 ASEAN - China (S) EIA 
2 Australia - New Zealand (ANZCERTA) (S) EIA 
3 CARICOM (S) EIA 
4 EFTA (S) EIA 
5 MERCOSUR (S) EIA 
6 Australia – Chile FTA & EIA 
7 Brunei Darussalam – Japan FTA & EIA 
8 Canada – Chile FTA & EIA 
9 Canada – Peru FTA & EIA 
10 Chile – Colombia FTA & EIA 
11 Chile - Costa Rica (Chile - Central America) FTA & EIA 
12 Chile - El Salvador (Chile - Central America) FTA & EIA 
13 Chile – Japan FTA & EIA 
14 Chile – Mexico FTA & EIA 
15 China - Hong Kong, China FTA & EIA 
16 China - Macao, China FTA & EIA 
17 China - New Zealand FTA & EIA 
18 China – Singapore FTA & EIA 
19 Costa Rica – Mexico FTA & EIA 
20 Dominican Republic - Central America - United 
States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) 
FTA & EIA 
21 EC – Albania FTA & EIA 
22 EC - CARIFORUM States EPA FTA & EIA 
23 EC – Chile FTA & EIA 
24 EC – Croatia FTA & EIA 
25 EC - Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia  FTA & EIA 
26 EC – Mexico FTA & EIA 
27 EFTA – Chile FTA & EIA 
28 EFTA - Korea, Republic of FTA & EIA 
29 EFTA – Mexico FTA & EIA 
30 EFTA – Singapore FTA & EIA 
31 European Economic Area (EEA) EIA 
32 Iceland - Faroe Islands FTA & EIA 
33 India – Singapore FTA & EIA 
34 Japan - Indonesia  FTA & EIA 
35 Japan – Malaysia FTA & EIA 
  
36 Japan – Mexico FTA & EIA 
37 Japan – Philippines FTA & EIA 
38 Japan – Singapore FTA & EIA 
39 Japan - Switzerland  FTA & EIA 
40 Japan – Thailand FTA & EIA 
41 Japan - Viet Nam  FTA & EIA 
42 Jordan – Singapore FTA & EIA 
43 Korea, Republic of – Chile FTA & EIA 
44 Korea, Republic of – Singapore FTA & EIA 
45 Mexico - El Salvador (Mexico - Northern Triangle) FTA & EIA 
46 Mexico - Guatemala (Mexico - Northern Triangle) FTA & EIA 
47 Mexico - Honduras (Mexico - Northern Triangle) FTA & EIA 
48 Mexico – Nicaragua FTA & EIA 
49 New Zealand – Singapore FTA & EIA 
50 Nicaragua - Chinese Taipei FTA & EIA 
51 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) FTA & EIA 
52 Pakistan – Malaysia FTA & EIA 
53 Panama – Chile FTA & EIA 
54 Panama - Costa Rica (Panama - Central America) FTA & EIA 
55 Panama - El Salvador (Panama - Central America) FTA & EIA 
56 Panama - Honduras (Panama - Central America ) FTA & EIA 
57 Panama – Singapore FTA & EIA 
58 Panama and Chinese Taipei  FTA & EIA 
59 Peru – China FTA & EIA 
60 Peru – Singapore FTA & EIA 
61 Singapore – Australia FTA & EIA 
62 Thailand – Australia FTA & EIA 
63 Thailand - New Zealand FTA & EIA 
64 Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership FTA & EIA 
65 US – Australia FTA & EIA 
66 US – Bahrain FTA & EIA 
67 US – Chile FTA & EIA 
68 US - Jordan  FTA & EIA 
69 US – Morocco FTA & EIA 
70 US - Oman FTA & EIA 
71 US - Peru FTA & EIA 
72 US - Singapore FTA & EIA 
73 EC (15) Enlargement CU & EIA 
74 EC (25) Enlargement  CU & EIA 
75 EC (27) Enlargement CU & EIA 
76 EC Treaty CU & EIA 
Total number of services PTAs 76 
Total number of services only PTAs 6 
  
Total number of goods PTAs 196 
Total number of PTAs in force 272 
Total number of services PTAs as a percentage of total 
RTAs in force 
27.94% 
 
Source: World Trade Organisation, RTAs Database. Available online from  
http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx .    
Note: 
WTO statistics on PTAs are based on notification requirements rather than on 
physical numbers of PTAs. Thus, for an PTA that includes both goods and 
services, two notifications are counted (one for goods and the other services), 
even though it is physically one PTA. 
  
TABLE 2. LIST OF ‘SERVICES ONLY’ PTAS 
 
Number Agreement Type 
1 ASEAN - China  EIA 
2 Australia - New Zealand (ANZCERTA)  EIA 
3 CARICOM  EIA 
4 EFTA  EIA 
5 MERCOSUR  EIA 
6 European Economic Area (EEA) EIA 
 
 
Source: World Trade Organisation, RTAs Database. Available online from  
http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx .    
Note: In the WTO’s RTA Database, these agreements are listed as covering 
services only. 
 
TABLE 3. CLASSIFICATION OF PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS (PTAS) 
FEATURING SERVICES PROVISIONS BY COUNTRY GROUPINGS (NORTH-NORTH, 
NORTH-SOUTH, SOUTH-SOUTH)54 
 
Number N-N N-S S-S 
1 Australia - New 
Zealand 
(ANZCERTA)   
Australia - Chile ASEAN - China  
2 EFTA  Brunei Darussalam - 
Japan 
CARICOM  
3 European Economic 
Area (EEA) 
Canada - Chile MERCOSUR  
4 EC (15) Enlargement Canada - Peru Chile - Colombia 
5 EC (25) Enlargement  Chile - Japan Chile - Costa Rica 
(Chile - Central 
America) 
6 EC (27) Enlargement China - New 
Zealand 
Chile - El Salvador 
(Chile - Central 
America) 
7 EC Treaty Dominican Republic 
- Central America - 
United States Free 
Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA-DR) 
Chile - Mexico 
8 Iceland - Faroe 
Islands 
EC - Albania China - Hong Kong, 
China 
9 Japan - Switzerland  EC - CARIFORUM 
States EPA 
China - Macao, 
China 
10 US – Australia EC - Chile China – Singapore 
                                                 
54 The term “PTAs” subsumes all categories of preferential agreements (i.e. customs unions, 
free trade agreements and economic unions).  
  
11  EC - Croatia Costa Rica - 
Mexico 
12  EC - Former 
Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia  
India – Singapore 
13  EC - Mexico Jordan - Singapore 
14  EFTA - Chile Korea, Republic of - 
Chile 
15  EFTA - Korea, 
Republic of 
Korea, Republic of – 
Singapore 
16  EFTA - Mexico Mexico - El 
Salvador (Mexico - 
Northern Triangle) 
17  EFTA - Singapore Mexico - Guatemala 
(Mexico - Northern 
Triangle) 
18  Japan - Indonesia  Mexico - Honduras 
(Mexico - Northern 
Triangle) 
19  Japan - Malaysia Mexico - Nicaragua 
20  Japan - Mexico Nicaragua – 
Chinese Taipei 
21  Japan - Philippines Pakistan – Malaysia 
22  Japan - Singapore Panama – Chile 
23  Japan - Thailand Panama - Costa 
Rica (Panama - 
Central America) 
24  Japan - Viet Nam  Panama - El 
Salvador (Panama - 
Central America) 
25  New Zealand - 
Singapore 
Panama - Honduras 
(Panama - Central 
America) 
26  North American Free 
Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) 
Panama - 
Singapore 
27  Singapore - Australia Panama and 
Chinese Taipei 
28  Thailand - Australia Peru - China 
29  Thailand - New 
Zealand 
Peru - Singapore 
30  Trans-Pacific 
Strategic Economic 
Partnership 
 
31  US – Bahrain  
32  US – Chile  
33  US - Jordan   
34  US – Morocco  
35  US – Oman  
  
36  US – Peru  
37  US - Singapore  
 
Source: World Trade Organisation, RTAs Database. Available online from  
http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx .    
 
  
Chart 1. Comparing the GATS and EU-CARIFORUM Commitments: Barbados 
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Source: Sauvé and Ward (2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chart 2. Comparing GATS and the EU-CARIFORUMCommitments: 
Dominican Republic 
 
 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Other services not included
elsewhere
Transport services
Recreational, cultural and
sporting services
Tourism and travel related
services
Health related and social
services
Financial services
Environmental services
Educational services
Distribution services
Construction and related
engineering services
Communication services
Business services
Partial Full Partial Full Partial Full Unbound
GATS only EPA improvements EPA new subsectors
 
Source: Sauvé and Ward (2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chart 3. Comparing GATS and the EU-CARIFORUM Commitments: 
Jamaica 
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Chart 4. Comparing GATS and the EU-CARIFORUMCommitments: 
Trinidad and Tobago 
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